# EUPHUIA,

OR

# THE ACTS,

AND

# CHARACTERS

OF A

# GOOD NATURE.

Written

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*Nemo repentè fit turpissimus.*

LONDON,

Printed for *John Crook*, at the Sign of the Ship in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1665.

Reader.

*Having well considered of my Friends, and acquaintance; I find that this piece (such as it is) being writ by no one patern, can deserve no other Patron, then its own subject; the common Good Nature. Neither was it without some reluctancy, e're I could be brought to acknowledge it my self; being vanquished (at last) in this: That it was the more shame (of the two) to seem to disown it. As if I might not appear in publick as confidently as another? Or were afraid to justifie the contents of it: since to write for simple vertue (not pretending much to wit, or Learning) is but mean, and out of fashion? Or, in fine, as if I would have it thought; That it is not worthy of my cognisance for want of accomplishment both of Style and Method (having done it, indeed, in a transitory state, as some of my friends know; and examined my references since?) But as it is come to this pass, It was*

at first in my liberty to write what I pleased (below the ambition of perpetuity) and to communicate with my Friends, and it was in theirs afterwards to commend it: and in the Stationers (from them) to run the risque of its popularity. And now, it is in yours to censure, as you think meet, which I know the common forms of Apology neither can restrain, nor qualify. Nor can I be excused on pretense of necessity; if that, of meer idleness in the making, and easiness in the parting with it, will not serve. Only, if you purpose to proceed, I am to meet you with this anticipation. That I do not account moral vertues to subside, or be determined in the Acts of a Good Nature, (that flow, as it were, ex tempore, and ever bear themselves in the same posture) but I suppose them to be vertuous; even without, and beyond intention: not disparageable with imperfection in their kind, or distinguishable from the matter or form of higher vertues: but rather to be such fundamental rudiments, without which no vertue can be grounded, or improved: such seeds of excellency as cannot be acquired by art or industry: and native worth in some that is inimitable unto others. If mo-

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ral vertue had been my Argument, I ſhould have founded it in rule, and reaſon, and will, and the uſe of Fortune. A thing ſo conſiderable in it, that for that cauſe, of all the lives that have been written, rarely can a man find an apt example for his imitation. Or in all the Comments, appoſite words and caſes to apply to his occaſion: So that oftentimes the Learned and well-principled, when they come to practiſe, act like other men, and are exceeded by (meerly) prompter ſpirits. Beſides, that through neceſsity a man can hardly arrive to acts of generoſity, or come off with ſplendor: which in ſome ſort of vertue is plainly requiſite. But in this ſubject, all magnificent pens have gloried: mine has only travel'd in the Accedence of Morality. And when I found ſome wit; that attireth all vice in the dreſs of Nature; ſome Politiques, that make intereſt more intrinſecal, then the common notions, and ſome Authority, ſlighting all actions not intended, and ſquared to a preſcript rule: I thought ſomewhat was (of right) to be aſſerted from them, and not to let their Natural endowments deprive all other of their Moral. Wherein (if I may be ſerious) I undertake the cauſe of all ages, and of all par-

*ticulars, since the same that seem to traduce this simple Nature; in effect, do seek it most exquisitely in their wives, and friends, and children. And so I pass, gentle Reader, into your power; as a person bound by my own principles to be void of interest, and ambition. Though I know I must be judged, like those that have written* de contemnendâ gloriâ. *But what I cannot possibly avoid in a matter of no greater moment, I may readily embrace, and retire notwithstanding safe in obscurity.*

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*Euphuia,*

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# *Euphuia*, &c.

§. 1. AS the skilful Herbaliſts, when they go on ſimpling, do not make choice of curious gardens, for the boundaries of their ſearch, but rather chooſe to traverſe the wide World, to find the variety of Natures ſprinkling. So if we ſeek for ſtrippes, and ſprings of goodly diſpoſitions, we muſt not be confined to noble Cultures; but every field, and Grove (with the wilds, and waſts of the Hundred) may afford as well as they, ſomewhat worthy of our tranſplanting, or collecting. For, as *Marius* pleadeth, in excuſing the obſcurity of his birth, that Nature is but one, and common unto all, ſo it is here. And wherever it is found in greater force, or better temper, there it is the more generous. Why ſhould we ſtand gazing at the ſteps and nods of Princes, if not to lead us into error, and admiration? 'Tis art, whatſoever we obſerve, Nature affordeth nothing elſe but motion. Or why ſhould we only wander in the Common,

*Natura una, & communis eſt omnium: fortiſſimus verò quiſquam generoſiſſimus eſt.* Saluſt.

to regard the rude and undiſciplin'd? Nature is reſtrained there from play (wherein ſhe would affect to ſhew her gayety) through ignorance, and want of converſation. Or if we ſtill hold our judgments unprejudicated, why ſhould we not compare them with the mean; while we often ſee the high born and bred to have but weak and paſſive ſpirits, and ſome that ſprout up among the ſtubs, to culminate with the Cedars, and to gather as they grow, the flower of all accompliſhments? But we are not to travel in extremities. We may find the characters of beauty and perfection in a Paſtoral, as well as in a Tragædy. And therefore we will take all indifferently in our obſervation: though the Great are our only inſtances, and the Mean, when they are produced, are not known.

What ſhould we ſtand to diſpute, whether vertue be more from Nature, or from Diſcipline, ſince that would only be to argue in the figure of the word? We take it not for ſtrength Natural, which is equally applicable to good, or evil; or for any Act according to election, which may be only from the dictate of our reaſon, and beſides our inclination; but we take it for a rectitude of moral diſpoſitions, from whence we account a perſon good, and well-conditioned, who is ſo endowed. Education may teach us good manners, as they are in faſhion; but it doth not weaken malice, but rather helps it to be more artificial. Study

may

may amend the Principles, reſtrain the progreſs of a vice, correct the tenor of our Life: but it cannot render any one ſo gracious, or ſo acceptable, as a good nature untutored. In fine, the force of fortune hath no little influence upon our tempers to diſguiſe us from our ſelves and others.

Wherefore in enquiring after good Nature, we may ſooner find our game among the Humaniſts, then among the School-men; and put her up with a pack of deſcriptions, than take her in the chace (as it were) with one courſer, by a ſingle definition. But the Huntſman (firſt) muſt appoint the grounds to us. And they are thus ample.

1. That Nature hath not been ſo much reſtrained unto any man, as to allow him no good qualities. A fool may be kind and charitable. A ſlave obſequious and loving to his Maſter. A deformed man ingenious. *Therſites* did not want ſomewhat in him, to recommend him to ſome mans phancy, that could diſtinguiſh. Neither *Æſop*, nor the Prieſt, whom the Queen deſcended to ſalute, as he lay in ſleeping. Nay, we ſee (ſometimes) an ill-favour'd lout (as he ſeems to others eyes) to be graced with the bed, and favour of a beauteous Lady, whom likelier perſons have ſought; and have been repulſed. Not to ſpeak of the moſt vicious, whoſe evil parts may be but the corruptions of their excellent endowments miſemployed: the moſt contemptible have ſomewhat in them to bear them up againſt neglect. A curr (that is unprofitable)

ble) hath exquiſite wayes of fawning, and inſinuating with his Maſter, to ſave his skin, or fill his belly; ſo that he may fare better than the Talbot. As we likewiſe ſee an empty droll better feaſted, then a Grave Philoſopher, but they are not ſo much to be envyed for what they have, as to be pityed for what they want.

2. That Nature hath not given all good parts to any one man. [*Onc ne furent a tous toutes graces don nées.*] for if ſhe had; her prodigality upon that one, would cauſe that all the reſt, that ſhe hath beſtowed on others, ſhould be in vain. He, while he were as a God amongſt men, would be inſupportable in the World; while all accumulation of honours and regards were devolv'd on him, a general Ebbe would leave the other fiſhes to periſh on the dry ſhoar: and this *Leviathan* would ſcarce be covered in the middle of the waters. But ſhe hath rather ſo provided, that ſomewhat there ſhould be in one to recompence the defect of another: and ſomewhat elſewhere to counter-balance men that are excellent, that the World might not be too narrow to contain them.

3. That a crooked, maimed, or infirm body are to be allowed for their imperfections, in ſo many grains extraordinary, whatſoever vertue you require in them. for whatever noble inſtincts may be in them, the ſoul cannot act

*Ad nullum conſurgit opus, cùm corpore languet.*

act without its organs; but when it is about to iſſue, it is diſtorted. They cannot chooſe but be affected, as they feel within themſelves; when they are about to ſhew their courteſy, ſomewhat indiſcernable may pain and incommode them; as an aking tooth may interrupt one (if it be no more) in the midſt of his diſcourſe; and then if you wonder to ſee the debonnaire on a ſuddain to become tachy and unſociable, while he perceives, and ſtrives to correct it, he may falter upon ſome other paſſion, or diſeaſe, and make it worſe by his endeavour of amending. To theſe, it may be ſome fair quality may want a ſeat of action, or the faculty be ſunk in the rubbiſh, and ruine of a member.

*In vitium ducit culpæ fuga ſi caret arte.*

4. That there are divers other affections of the body, that have an influence upon the ſoul. A lean one preyeth on the ſweet and oyly humours, and ſo conſumes the fewel of its own contentment. A little body is ſoon agitated, as if the ſpirits wanted room to expatiate, and 'tis receiv'd (almoſt) among the vulgar, that little heads are teſty. But if there be exceſs of dimenſions, it makes the whole unactive, and the parts unwieldy. Beſides, though you ſee nothing but a body well-diſpoſed, the parts within may be inordinate. The veins and arteries may be ſtrait, and ſubject to obſtructions; ſo that tranſpiration is not free, nor the courſe of the bloud and ſpirits open to the extremities of the body

body, whereby it cannot feel its ſelf in an (εὐξία, or) good eſtate, and habit of complexion. Neither is it poſſible for ſome to obtain ſo good a temper, who are born with evil humours, as we bring with us for the moſt part, ſome familiar maladies (like evil Geniuſes) attending on us all our life, Either thin and fluid humors, or groſs and tough, or ſalt and fiery ſpirits, or ſharp and ſubtle as if they were the rennet of Cold and melancholy.

5. Laſtly, That therefore the agreement of body, and mind muſt be conſidered, and then the field may be diſcreetly beaten for our priſe. There is a kind of Phyſiognomy, that diſcovers a good Nature, wherein any ordinary man may have ſome inſight. The beggar ſpyeth where to be importunate. The cheat where to follow. The hector where to brave, or to beware. The Courtier where to allure: but ſome aſpects there are agreeable unto every one liking, where none conceiveth a ſuddain prejudice; or hateth at the firſt ſight, or envyeth their good eſtate, or affecteth to do them any hurt for their owe ſakes, but findeth that humanity in them, which all the World reſpecteth. Such is that (moſt part) that preſenteth a cleer and even skin, a ruddy countenance, a conſtitution full and ſound, that is neither apt to thrive nor abate, and a mine of air and behaviour, neither ſlow, nor vehement, but ſtrong and ſweet, and ſuch as ſheweth a promptneſs to intenſion, and remiſſion,

miſſion, as occaſion ſerveth. A body free from uneven parts, eſpecially uneven eye-brows, prominent lips, or an eminent (Romane) noſe. If any other parts be unequal, one cannot therefore exclude that party from having any good parts within him; but we cannot lightly take him for the copy of our Character. But there is nothing more regardable than the habit of the eyes: which if they bear that full and ſteddy look, that importeth Confidence, and admit thoſe repercuſſions that enkindle baſhfulneſs, and emit thoſe caſts and glances, that are ſignificant of gentle paſſions, they do undoubtedly evince the tokens of a likely perſon.

§. II. But to leave it unto women to be pleaſed in the out ſide of a man, and to allow them (what they affect in this caſe) to be the competenter Judges. Let us paſs to the habits of the mind: and then (to be ſure) whatſoever we diſcover to be good in one, is good in another, and indifferent to both our Sexes.

I take it once for granted, that a Good Nature enjoyes a conſtant ſweetneſs within it ſelf, while it is endued abundantly with a free courſe of blood and ſpirits, circling in its breaſt; and filling it with love of life both in it ſelf and others: and delighting moſt in interchanging of vivacity.

1. And firſt, That it doth not owe its cheerfulneſs to any foreign cauſe, but only to its native vigour, and ſource of anhelation. And whom doth

doth it not revive to ſee alacrity in another without apparent cauſe? Eſpecially, when there is no inſolence, or affected motion to be diſcovered. Who would not wiſh and earn for ſuch an acquaintance, and think himſelf happy to have a part in one, that is (indeed) happy of himſelf? To ſee his action, obſerve his countenance, note the harmony of his heart, and tongue; and hear the melody of his ſpeech, and tone; while every accent is a ſtrain of birds, or Angels?

And yet the cauſe is not ſo abſtruſe, the ebullition of freſh and airy ſpirits gently moves the bloud, and excites the ſweeter humours of the body, ſuch * as love and joy flow upon, and yeild no place to a ſyncope, or interciſion of the ſoul, ſuch as grief and ſorrow do inflict by the ſharper humours that they prepare, and empty from the Gall, and other veſſels ordain'd to ſever them, Beſides, that innocency is a conſtant guard upon the blandiſhments of the mind, and affords ſecurity to all the thoughts to play with their ſimplicity. For bitter paſſions ſeldom come, till we begin to trade with fortune, and * taint our apprehenſions with things preter-natural. Not as if a Good Nature were beyond the reach of fortune (for the fair are commonly ſaid to be unfortunate) A Brother, or a Lover may be ſnatch't away; or his time may travel over barren ground, and make waſt in his progreſs.

* *M. de la chambre.*

* *Sext Empiricus.*

But

But abſtinence and contentment are not difficult to a mind not debauch't with Luxury, ſince Nature is contented with a little, and it is more natural to ſuch a temper to take delight in the good that is preſent, then to wreek for that which is abſent (peradventure) more than wanting, but its power were not to be ſeen were there nothing to oppreſs it. [*Marcet ſine adverſario virtus.*] Sen. The breathing of a ſpring will bear a light thing above the water; if it be ſtifled with earth and rubbiſh, in time 'twill wear them quite away, or elſe it will riſe again in another Ciſtern of its own inventing. The Palm-tree ſhooteth up with the more vigour having weights hang'd upon it. And the preſſed Camomill yields with a modeſt fragrancy, but as ſoon as the chaſtening Roller is gone beyond it, it rears itſelf again to court the air and dew that cheriſh it, ſo a * Good Nature is not toiled with adverſity or changed without ſubverſion. But ſo it liveth with its ſelf.

* *Buenco. raçon quebranta mala ventura.*

2. Next, let us ſee how it delights it ſelf in the life of others, which we may take ſome pleaſure to obſerve in the vanity of little children. Whereas you may obſerve ſome (as ſoon as they can expreſs the primer copy of their reaſons) to be craving many things, making little difference of the hand, or the party, ſo they be but gratified: becauſe their delight is more in divers toyes than in their play-fellows. or in their dayly

dayly ſervants that attend to humour them: you ſhall note ſome other better natured, that take no joy but in their companions, that will not eat, nor drink, nor (by their good will) ſleep without them. That will not be pleas'd with any thing when they riſe again, without reſtoring them to their wonted paſtime, and their known Aſſociates. The ſame rejoyce in getting more acquaintance and making more friends to play with them: but yet they will not endure to be with ſtrangers without the company of ſome they know, becauſe they diſtinguiſh of whom they know, and of whom they love; not through averſeneſs unto any, but only of imbecility, when they find themſelves denuded of their proper Aids and Relyances. For, the ſame Nature, with the benefit of experience, leads them on to an Univerſal Humanity. And it ſeems that Humane Nature is rather to be learned by obſerving the reſpective characters of growing years, then by forming notions out of their Matureſt actions; which it is moſt likely, are accommodated unto fortune, or neceſſity. Neither is it wonder, if theſe have ſtill impell'd mankind to an Uniform mode, or way of contending about the Partition of conveniences among men, but it would be wonder, to ſee a child by Nature ſo Pugnacious, that without any provocation, it ſhould ſtill be fighting. I am more inclinable to think with Sir *P. Sidney*, that man is a Good Natur'd creature till he is injured. Neither do I think,

that

that every man could wiſh a great deſtruction, that he himſelf might come to deſolate poſſeſſions. But of this only *en paſſant*: I dare not enter into an argument, at the porch of which, *ſtat magni nominis umbra.*

§. III. To proceed from theſe two principles (that I ſuppoſe) I infer as neceſſary conſequents. 1. That a Good Nature is void of pride and ambition, 2. Void of intereſt and deſign.

1. While it readily cleaves to what it likes, more or leſs as it finds agreeableneſs; it is not averſe to any other, much leſs is it apt to hate any, ſeeing ſomewhat good in every one; ſo that though it do decline ſome qualities that are in perſons, and ſome perſons for thoſe qualities, yet it doth not hate them or deſpiſe them: Whereas all pride is founded in a ſecret malice.

The degrees of pride are two. The firſt, ſelf-conceitedneſs, whereby one eſteems himſelf better then another. The ſecond is ambition, whereby one ſeeks in act to put a diſtance, or to make a difference betwixt himſelf, and thoſe that he deſpiſeth, which do both neceſſarily induce hatred; inaſmuch as the proud conceiveth, that thoſe whom he deſpiſeth would oppoſe him, and arrogate as much unto themſelves, as he doth to himſelf (if it lay in their power) and therefore he doth either in act, or intention ſeek to depreſs them. Now as generous wines, when they retract their ſpirits to the Center of the veſſel, do become

eager in the extremities: ſo it happens to men of ſpirit, when they retire into themſelves by ſelf-conceitedneſs, they become unſociable in other parts, and are only pleaſant to their intimates, being ſuch as ſerve to elate them more; while they vainly nouriſh a caprice of grandeur with reſtraint of generoſity. But if their humour carry them abroad, to make it ſelf obſerved, it brings a reſtraint upon the publick, impoſeth upon others, abridgeth liberty, raiſeth expectation, and meeteth (at the laſt) with ſuch contempt and hatred from other men, as they themſelves have foſtered. Or if fortune favour their ambition, and bring the world about to their bent, ſo far as they have to do in it; yet it cannot blot out the indelible characters of their uſurpation, or the tokens that they muſt leave behind of their injuſtice. If *Cæſar* were the Tamer of the World, he was the overthrower of his Countrey. And ſo (before) was *Marius*: ſo was *Sylla*: nor was more to have been ſuſpected from *L. Catiline*. But the like ſucceſs doth not happen to one of a thouſand, not in meaner enterpriſes. And what (at length) is ſought by attempting? When *Pyrrhus*, King of *Epire*, prepared to paſs into *Italy*, *Cyneas*, a Councellor in eſteem with him, demands to what end he made that great preparation? Said he, to make my ſelf Maſter of *Italy*. And what, replies *Cyneas*, after that? I will paſs, ſaith he into *Gaule*, and into *Spain*. And what farther? I will go to con-

conquer *Africk*, and at laſt, when I have brought the world into my ſubjection, I will live at eaſe, and take my content. And I pray Sir, rejoyneth *Cyneas*, why may you not ſo do, at this preſent, and ſave your ſelf the hazards and the travels? It is the treating of deſigns that removeth preſent happineſs, making us to go out of our ſelves, and not to reſt in what we are, which the truly * happy only do, as the only means of their happineſs. A Good Nature is indifferently born to all mankind, and to all eſtates, and can never want either complacency in the firſt, or contentment in the later. It exacteth converſation to the utmoſt of its fortune, and excepts againſt none: for it hath no picque to make it eager againſt any. It eſteemeth no better of its own perſon or endowments, or fortunes then anothers. The beautiful deſpiſeth not the crooked, the ſtrong doth not violate the weak, nor the witty abuſe the ſimple, the rich and honorable do not ſcorn the company of the mean: Nor an high mind graſp at other acquiſitions, than what ly open to its own right, and title. For of theſe things that are injoyed in common, it reputeth: that as good are they that want them, as they that have them; and as happy they that are without them. The Prince, and the ſubject have the ſame Bread and Wine; the ſame fiſh and fowl; the ſame cloth and ſilk; the ſame commodities, and refreſh-

*Liv. I.*

* Ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐξάναι, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι ὅπερ εἰσι. *Plotin.*

ments(in reality)in common to them; The reſt is but imagination, the King thinks the private man more happy, and the private man thinks the King: But they both know their incommodities apart, & that no one man hath any reaſon to contemn another.

Nor is it the leaſt reſtraint from pride of a free and ingenuous ſpirit, the magnanimity that it has within it ſelf. For as he doth not undervalue, ſo neither doth he prefer any other before himſelf, whom he values only by his own right intentions acquieſcing in what he is, and not affecting to be any thing, that is another. He neither covets to detract, nor to depend, nor to have any others otherwiſe affected towards him, then he is towards them. For he is as continent in himſelf, and holds himſelf as happy, as him that he ſees to be more wiſe, or more ſtrong, or more allied, or befriended then himſelf. He cannot therefore be diſcompoſed with envy, or emulation, which are the tormentors of a proud ſpirit. For envy is a ſharp humour, that mantles the face with wrinkles, and fennowes the complexion, while it ſeeks no leſs to procure the diſſolution of the ſubject, then of the object: whereas a good temper loves & values the worth that is in another, reſpects his quality, covets to ſupport it, and deſires to communicate with it in the common benefits of vicinity. Emulation is more hainous, raiſing a ſedition in the commonwealth of vertue, and turning the faireſt Machines of wit and courage againſt the ſeat of æquanimity:

for

for it propagates envy, ſcatters the contagion into many hearts, and ſeeks to turn the balance to the contingency of force and violence, No matter what ſucceedeth, ſo that which ſtands in the way of its undue aſpiring be demoliſhed. Such furious ſpirits do not only moleſt the world with their actions; but bear a ſway in civil companies by their paſſions, till they are out of breath: and then thoſe clear and even carriages, that were wont to oblige and conquer men (more manfully) will be ready to evince them. But ſome one may be inſtant with me here.

If it be to debaſe my ſelf, being noble, to be Good Natured, is it not better to be proud? If it be to ſtay my advancement, being capable of obtaining it, is it not better to be ambitious? If it do not admit of Politick, and Martial vertues, whereby the world is governed, were it not better to unlearn it, then to ſtudy to be deceived with a vain name: Since aſſuredly, whatſoever makes men excellent cannot be a vice, howſoever it is termed, and whatſoever doth reſtrain them cannot be of vertue, howſoever it is ſtyled? Be it ſo, I do not ſuppoſe, that all Heroick actions are the Acts of Good Nature: but only, that a Good Nature is the apteſt ſubject of all Magnanimons vertues, and a kind of ſtock and fewel to them; but not to their contraries. If a man be noble, it prompts and ſupplies him with an high and generous mind, far above the vulgar; but it faileth

him in elation, or vain glory, or impotent domineering; which only make men great in their own conceits, and leſs in other mens. If he tend to advancement, the ſame incenſeth him by all the means that are fair and vertuous; for it is but ſloth and degeneration not to ſeek to mend his fortune, but to ambition his preferment with ſervility, or fraud, or cunning, his nature ſtarts back with abhorrency, and reclaims him (*Interdum in præſens tempus plus profici dolo, quam virtute*) that craft, though it ſeem to profit, finds a great abatement at the foot of the account, if it do not bring us back to begin again, or bring us into great intanglements; for by one miſcarriage more hath been loſt, then accrued by many Acts of vertue. The like in Politick and military devoirs, it boils under publick ſpirits, and makes the love of ones countrey like the love of Immortality: but it fails, if we begin to affect the Tyranny, to ſubvert the liberty, to enſlave the people, or exterminate the Nobility. Only here it ſtrikes and ſuffers violence. Happy was the Roman Common-wealth, while it had *Camillus, Cincinnatus*, and ſuch other Modeſt and invincible ſpirits upon all emergences to deliver it; and immediately to deliver up their ſupream Authority. But after one ill example (as *Tacitus* ſpeaks in another caſe of the Military election of an Emperour) when the myſtery of Uſurping was diſcovered, and the power of the Senate found to be waved

*Liv. l.* 42.

waved by *C. Marius*, a perſon of baſe Original, and a barbarous mind, it was not poſſible to reſtore, or ſupport it from farther lapſes.

2. Good Nature is void of intereſt, and deſign. Can'ſt thou love for love, and make that the reward? As the roundeſt mouthed of our *Comedians* has plac'd the words for me. But there is an end of all things and an action, or affection cannot be the end of itſelf: for it muſt be needs to obtain the fruition of ſomewhat beyond itſelf. How can this be? Yet to love for anothers love may import ſome valuable conſideration, for it cannot want effects and ſervices: but to love and delight in the acts thereof, when one knows the object to be inſolvent, or ingrateful, is not this a paradox of Good-Nature? But what? Can the Sun forbear to ſhine, becauſe it raiſeth ſtench from the dunghil? Or the Spring to flow, becauſe the ſtream is dam'd? Or the earth to yield its fruit, becauſe the husbandman permits it to rot upon the ground? To have a kind and liberal diſpoſition is ſo natural to a gentle breaſt, that it cannot be abſtracted, or in ſenſe, or reaſon. And that, although there be, that pay them with their own coin, receiving all as freely as it comes, as if the Good Nature only did it to eaſe it ſelf. and were obliged to its percipients. But ſuch a Nature ſoon becomes Maſter of its ſecond acts, and is not therefore fooliſh, becauſe it is ſimple. Though it take a pleaſure in its

*Eld. Broth. Fletcher.*

firſt acts, or emanations, yet it can improve it in its ſecond, without any foreign intereſt. He knows his goodneſs does as much conſiſt in the object, as the ſubject, and that it cannot be compleat if the object be not capable, that is, if it be ungrateful. For it doth not derogate from goodneſs to delight in the proper conſequents of its acts, as in love and commendation: but rather, that it ſelf is argument to commend it, for Contemners of * fame are commonly deſpiſers of vertue. To ſtrew ones bounty, as a way to lucre, or a ſtep to ambition, theſe indeed are the trains of the Maſquers, which the Nobler Spirits value with that contempt, that it deſerveth: But if veniality be profeſſed, and it be in an honeſt Candidation, we may then come in, not upon the ſcore of Good Nature, but of liberality and Magnificence, which are but ſuperſtructions. To advance yet a little farther, the moſt diſcreet and prudent acts of a free ſpirit may be ill requited, and yet it is not ſo weak as to repent them. As if one ſhould argue, I have found benefit by the free-heartedneſs of ſuch a perſon, and yet, I have no particular obligation to him: for he did not intend particular kindneſs unto me. What do we think? would it be a plauſible Compliment coming from the open houſe of a noble perſon, to tell him, you had made your ſelf welcome, and to bid him thank himſelf? Or being beſet with theeves or Ruffians, and

* *Cav. Biondi. Donz. Deſterrada.*

and by ſome liberal hand reſcued, to take your Congee, and bid him thank his own generoſity: he would have done no leſs for any other. Indeed, thoſe offices, that humanity doth exact, I am bound to do to the ungrateful; but in others, reaſon will not juſtifie a profuſion; howſoever a Good Nature is never diſcouraged, or diverted by diſappointments.

§. IV. Hitherto in generals; by the clearing of which it remains, that a Good Nature is moſt Amicable: under which, I entend to order all the ſubordinate affections of my ſubject, compriſing Amity and Humanity.

And firſt, I find Amity devided to my hand by an excellent * writer into four kinds. *viz.* Natural, Conjugal, Social, and Hoſpital: which are apt to compriſe the ſum of my diſcourſe on the firſt head, though otherwiſe one might be ſtyled ſo, more aptly than the reſt.

* *Les Eſſais de Michel Seigneur de Montaigne.*

1. Natural affection deſcends upon children like weights from a pulley, with invincible ſprings of revolution, ever labouring to advance them, and never reſting in any meaſure of benevolence. All its benefits are ſolid, all its paſſions are unfeigned, all its actions to the utmoſt. What bounds or limits can circumſcribe a thing that is indefinite, according to the goodneſs of the Relatives? If we conſider it at divers ſeaſons; Hope, and longing earnes towards their tender years, expectation looks

looks wiſtfully towards their growing, endeavours alwayes ready to promote their well doing. Joy in their proſperity. Anxiety in their doubtful ſtate. Sollicitude for their recovery, and grief for their miſcarriages; And none of theſe indifferent. What delight may be conceived in their preſence can only be eſtimated by the grief of parting, and tediouſneſs of abſence, and exultancy at their return. The Roman Dames have dyed in embraces on their ſons necks, returned from the fatal *jours* of *Cannæ* and *Thraſymenus*. And the Græcian Matrons for joy of their ſons victories in a *Pythian* or *Olympian* game. If theſe affections be not ſtrong, the Parent is unnatural, *i. e.* as vitious in this kind as can be: for he cannot do more; he cannot hate his iſſue: No man ever hated his own fleſh. Yet this affection worketh diverſly, according to the quality of the breaſts wherein it is fomented, whereby we may ſee, what tyranny opinion may ſometimes exerciſe over nature. *Brutus* the firſt of the Roman Conſuls, was accounted no ill man. Yet when his 2 ſons were convicted of conſpiracy againſt the Common-wealth, he ſate over them (as his place required) and when all the eyes of the people were bent upon him, to ſee how he would behave himſelf, he commanded them to be executed, [*eminente animo patrio inter publica pæne miniſterium*] his publick ſpirit overbare his private. He was able to keep his countenance unaltered. And this was commended in him,

*Liv. l. 2.*

him, not as inhumane, but as ſomewhat more then humane. But when *Torquains Manlius* put his ſon to death for a proſperous fight without authority, the Youth of *Rome* diſdained his triumph, and hated to go out to meet him, ſtyling thenceforward ſevere commands *Manliana Imperia.* Yet he had publick reaſon, and is not yet acquitted to poſterity. For the laws of Nature ſeem to be greater then any laws of diſcipline; nay, then the laws of the Commonwealth. It is not exacted in our law for a Wife, or a ſon to impeach a Husband or a Father: nor are condemned if they be receivers of his ſtollen goods, becauſe they could not do leſs than obey his command, and conceal his treſpaſs, which the law doth not imagine that a Wife, or a Son ought to judge, or to ſuſpect; although (indeed) it be evident that they know it. *L. l. 8.*

But the temper of *Zaleucus* is moſt admired, who having made a law to exoculate thoſe, that were taken in adultery, and his Son being firſt taken he put out one of his ſons eyes, and another of his own. So at once appearing a moſt indulgent Father, and an upright Judge; which I ſhall rather leave for a ſubject of declamation, then examine here.

2. Such is love deſcending: The retribution is not expected to be ſo ample. *Perſolui gratia non poteſt, nec malo Patri.* The filial is rather duty, though ſuch as implyeth love and honour. It is

insinuated to us from the first stretchings of our arms and hands for succour, with the first stammerings of our tongues, and earliest exertions of our reasons. Sence and experience trill it down gently to the bottoms of our hearts; and custom and education combine with Nature to augment and cherish it. Though we suffer many things in our childishness which we take in evil part; yet flesh and bloud is a faithful Monitor to reduce us to submission; And that indelible obligation to refresh our obedience. In the midst of a disgust, the misadventure of a parent will bring the child into concern, and every ligament of its heart will ake at his jeopardy; for every nerve in its body is a cord of affection, that binds to him that gave them. When *Cræsus*'s son, who was born tonguetyed, saw his Father like to be smitten in a Battel, he cryed save the King, and dyed by that endeavour. But if there be a true aversion, from thence a real longing for the Fathers ἀποθανεῖν, *ut sit divus, modo non sit vivus.* There is no apology, no reason, no vertue to excuse it. 'Tis incompatible with the temper of a Good Nature, When the daughter of *Servius Tullius*, being married to a *Tarquin*, conspired with her Husband the death of the King her Father through ambition of the Kingdom, she made her Chareteere to drive over his dead body as he lay slain in the streets, to the utter detestation of mankind; but with such a sort of wickedness, as is yet untermed by any name.

name. For if *Solon* thought fit to make no law againſt Parricide, becauſe it had never been committed, leaſt he ſhould ſeem to admoniſh of a crime unheard of, rather than to prohibit it: how could ſuch a fact as hers, (an inſtance once for ever) be known or branded by any common appellation? She is an example without parallel. But ſhould we go about to enumerate others on the contrary, we might be infinite. Only that ſame *Manlius*, who was ſo ſevere a Father, deſerves to be commended as a Son. For whereas his Father was accuſed by the Tribunes of the People (among other things) for ignoble and unworthy breeding of himſelf, he came to *M. Pomponius*, the chief Proſecutor, and entring with him, as it were for farther information, into his appartment, he there obliged him, ſeting his ponyard to his breaſt, to diſmiſs the whole appeal, which when it came to light procured him honor and advancement.

Cic. *Pro* Roſcio *ne non tam prohibere, quàm admonere videretur*

*Liv. l. 7.*

3. *Fratrum quoque gratia rara eſt.* 'Tis obſerved that Brothers ſeldom do agree; whether through too much familiarity, which engenders contempt; or too much competition, while they account themſelves by nature equal, by favour prejudiced, or by law and cuſtom impeached of their native priviledges, interfering with one another. They are oft in brigues and skirmiſhes, and

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as oft in reconcilements, and recrudities. Their fallings out are but means of their holding ſtill together, and when they ſeem to be at the greateſt diſtance, they fall into an eaſy coalition againſt a ſtranger, that ſeeks the wrong of either. Acquaintance from the cradle, ſimilitude derived from their parents, ſympathy of affections, frequent broiles, and paſſions do the more cement them: and though the wealth of one be the impoveriſhing of another, yet the cauſe is foreign; and the ſtronger hath a natural reſpect for the weaker, and the weaker a natural dependance upon the ſtronger: which is more near, than remote acquired aids, and leſs offenſive (becauſe more ſecret, and more due) to the ſenſe of honor, and reputation. So that brotherly love anſwers many obligations, that are to be underſtood, and never to be expreſt. And wherever any Amity is comprehenſive of more reſpects, it may multiply unto infinite: eſpecially where the ground of it is ſo pure, and unqueſtionable. Which hath moved the moſt intimate of friends to adopt this appellation, as the moſt ſignificant of perfect Amity. *Cato* the younger, who could find in his heart to let his friend *Munatius*, coming kindly to ſee him in his province of *Cyprus* * to part from him diſobliged, and take no notice of it; neither was ſo ready afterwards to make him ſatisfaction: was ſo fond of his Brother *Cæpio*, that for 20. years he neither ſup't, nor walk't abroad with-

* *Plutarch.*

without him, he followed him into the Camp, he left his charge to viſit him in another Countrey, being ſick, and finding him deceaſed, lamented over him in ſuch manner, as was not accounted ſeemly in a valiant, or a wiſe man ( ſuch as he was reputed ) and being ever counted parſimonious to it, ſpent the value of eight Talents upon his Monument. So much may be in Brotherhood, when ingenuous Minds are brought up both together. Nor ( peradventure ) whatſoever is conceited, can any other friends depending upon will or fancy be any more, than an imitation of it, even as art imitates Nature, or the ſhadow repreſents the life, for ſecondary acts can but tend to make an union like the firſt. What can we do for a friend more, than to make him as our ſelf, to adopt him into our bloud, and account him as con-native to us?

4. The love of a Brother to a Siſter is ſo pure and innocent by Nature, as if it took no notice of any difference of ſexes: ſave only as a Brother reſpects the tenderneſs of a Siſter, and a Siſter honours the worth and valour of a Brother, and is moſt paſſionate in his concerns and ſervices. *Q. Margaret de valois* hath written her memoirs ( almoſt ) on purpoſe to ſhew what affection ſhe bore the perſon, and the intereſts of her Brother the Duke of *Alençon* ( the name that was ſo gracious to our *Q. Elizabeth*, ) and what perſecutions it did occaſion her. So that this ſex may have

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a pure Amity towards men, and are moſt unjuſtly beſpattered anent their faireſt offices. Their civility, their ſecrecy, their pity, their ſedulity, their pretty arts of covering, and diſſembling (which are unſearchable) when they ſeek to do a kindneſs, are traduced and prophaned. The abuſe of them is the more hainous, eſpecially where there ſhould not be any ſhadow of ſuſpition, as among relations. Inceſt is as Murther, or as treaſon, a thing abhorrent unto Nature, which many brutes decline, and will rather waſt their ſolitude, And to bring diſhonor on a kinſwoman is conſpiracy againſt the whole bloud, an act of malice greater than of luſt. For the fences that are between relations are but weak and moveable, being their diſtinct eſtates are apt to be coincident into one family. Hence an uncle is collateral to a Father, a Coſin-german to a Brother, and the more remote are but ſupplemental to defects that may happen. The diſtinct and diſtant Manſions of a worthy kindred are like City and Countrey-houſes to one another where they have confidence & community and are mutual ſtayes, and pledges againſt viciſſitudes and turns of fortune. They are friends which nature gives, which uſe confirms, which are made perfect at the firſt ſight, if Relation be but mentioned. Coſins do as frequently reſemble one another as Brothers Uterines, They have ſomewhat in them gentilitial to the family. Their lineaments, features, aires, graces, manners, ſome or other,

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more or leſs do ſymbolize together, and call (as it were) upon one another to be mutually ingratiated. Yet there are, that ſlight theſe bonds as complemental and unneceſſary; that hate an obligation coming on them without election, that prefer any other of their own acquiſt; that think themſelves to be born at liberty, and not to be contracted but by their own choice and pleaſure. This I hear, but take it to be moſt ungrateful, and unworthy of a noble ſpirit, if in what it vindicates to its own will, it derogates from Nature, whoſe bond is indiſpenſable. Neither can I judge that perſon capable of a choſen friendſhip, who is but a formal and perfunctory Courtier of his conſanguinity, or allyances.

§. V. Of the next ſort of Amity, me-ſeemes there may be ſome doubt; whether the Heroick love (which being in order to it, we will therefore conſider under the ſame head) be not greater then the conjugal. For ſo it ſeems by all the fables of the Poets, which have raiſed this to admiration by variety of examples; While the poor *Penelope* would have been but a ſolitary inſtance of Conjugal affection: if the Vertuous Sir *P. Sidney* (ſenſible of that defect) had not once ſupplyed us with the ſtory of *Argalus* and *Parthenia*. And it ſeems in Nature that nothing can be greater then this Heroick flame, for it is the firſt product of the excellency of ſtrength both of ſoul and body. When the blood is warm, the ſpirits light and

airy, the humours ſoft and oyly; when the phancy is luculent, and moſt affected with the object of its brightneſs, the reaſon ever agitated, and the memory moſt tenacious of impreſſions. Then the valiant youth is urg'd by nature to the uttermoſt, knowing that youth is fleeting; and once illuded, conceiveth flames no more. Wherefore here ſhe incenſeth him, here ſhe glories in his humbleneſs, no leſs then in his bravery, here ſhe triumphs in variety of affections. The mind is reſtleſs in deviſing how to take, oblige, and compaſs; and the body as its inſtrument, muſt acknowledge no wearineſs, ſhrink at no danger, omit no watching: but hold it ſelf ſtill in the brighteſt armour, as if it were to revel in the midſt of a battel. The eyes are ſcattered like wandring ſpirits: the colour comes and goes in longing, bluſhing, and aſpiring: the lips tremble, and the hands that took the boldneſs, ſhake in the handling of the arms of love. The lover ſtrait becomes a priſoner to a labyrinth, where he counts his bondage the ſweeteſt liberty, and to tread the maze more deſireable, then to find the clue.

*Des paſs. l. 2. artic. 86.* If deſire only (as *Des Cartes* apprehendeth) do compriſe horror and agreement. One on a ſudden apprehenſion of miſcarrying, the other in a ſettled repreſentation of enjoying ſomewhat moſt agreeable. If doubts and fears be a tendency towards deſpair (the wretched ſciatica of the ſoul) If hope it ſelf be

be but an unquiet inmate in a lovers breaſt, a vehement incendiary; and grief do but diſmally extinguiſh thoſe flames. Judge whether this love be not made of ſtrong ingredients, more than any other. While deſire ruleth, the good is abſent. Abſence of the object pines the faculty. If hope relieve, fear aſſayleth, delay tormenteth, diſappointment driveth unto madneſs; Longing ſtayeth and reduceth. The ſweetneſs of imagination dandleth and demulceth the eager ſpirits; until that air be vented in a ſigh and grief ſucceed to reſuſcitate the malignant humors. Such ſtorms are frequent in a lovers breaſt, ſuch change of weather, ſuch force of conſtellations, what can there be in any other love, that is not here? Can we but laugh to hear a debauched gallant (at laſt) to ſleight all woman-kind, to mock at love as folly, and in experience; and to make only men to be objects to one another? As if a fond fancy of ſome ſociety, or a proud conceit of worth and merit; or in fine, a ſence of obligation (which by bringing the obliged perſon into bondage through the tyranny of gratitude, doth commonly undermine its own Empire with a faction of liberty, ſince he that thinks himſelf more obliged to another, then he can readily requite, begins to hate him that hath a mortgage in him, and to have a ſecret averſation to his perſon) could be more available then Natures procurement, which is a vertuous deſire of conjunction between our ſexes;

whileſt in all motions, the Natural are more ſtrong then the moral, and this then any other Natural: A reſolute, or a valiant man cannot be by reaſon, if he have it not in the firmneſs of his mold or conſtitution; So as the ſoul is knit to the body, it is able to act in it, or above it, or without it. If it be weakly joyned, it will be apt to ſerve. If ſtrongly, it will make it ſuffer hunger or thirſt, or heat or cold, or caſt it headlong upon danger to attain its more heroick ends; and this of love, as its principal; but heroick love cannot be but in a young and lively ſpirit chaſt and inviolable.

And then, we may boldly ſay, that there cannot be ſuch affection between two parties of the ſame ſex, as between a pair of lovers; becauſe other love doth only tend to bring conveniences together; but this to propagate its like (the forcibleſt impulſe and chief deſign of Nature) to make two inclined Relations compleat in Union: In a word, to joyn bodies, as well as ſoules, and only ſo to make not as if it were another ſelf, but a real and entire combination of two in one. If therefore one man can love another, more then a woman, either he that loves is no man, or he that is beloved is an Hermophrodite, or ſomewhat more inhumane. But as this love (which we value by its energy in innocence and chaſtity) has as its nobleſt end, the butt of wedlock: ſo gold itſelf may be dear bought, and a thing highly priſed may ſink

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of value in fruition. Who would undergoe what is neceſſary in love, or honour, if he knew the vanity of his ends? Or ſerve an apprentiſhip, if he knew that that ſhould be the beſt of his time? Suffer ſo much in Amorous wooing, and in the remedy be worſer ganched then in the malady? For in marriage, how early is ſociety, how ready is neglect, how ſoon are other ends regarded, and the nimia of love as much ſtudied to be unlearned, as ever conn'd before? The ſervant practiſeth now to become a Maſter of his wife, a Father of his children, a Prince, or a Principal man in his country, Honour, Wealth, and Providence do cut off all the ſuperfluity of affection; and leave little elſe but law to bind wedlock. Whereas the Heroick love is ever longing, never ſatisfied, one deſire anſwered or attained multiplies a thouſand: ever ardent and over-valuing, never ſleighting, or remiſs: ever humble and obſequious, never haughty or imperious: ever ſingle, and ſolitary in its end and object: never intereſſed or employed in any other, but what may ſerve it. In a word, lives not in itſelf, but in its love.

*Much more of it might be ſaid,*
*But its laws I once obey'd.* *Co. Mont. Uraniag.*

Therefore ſay no more at firſt.

2. On the other ſide. There is no Faith in married men: ſome applauding it through ſenſuality, others weary of it for want of vertuous uſage, Others ſeeming to contemn it, becauſe they have

attained; who were they widowed ſhould indeed be cloſe mourners, and never reſt till they had repaired it. If it be the reward of noble ſervices, the beſt of all poſſeſſions, the end and reſt of all turmoiled paſſions: We may rather blame the vanity of the World, that can never anſwer expectation; then to blaſt thoſe flowers that are ready to bud, and teem with the choiceſt fruits of life. How incongruous is it to imagine that the thirſt ſhould be ſweeter then the wine, the hunger then the choiceſt fare? Can Heroick love, as it is accompanied with ſo many pangs and convulſions, be its own reward? Is there any pleaſure in doubts and fears? Is it better to be in the ſtorm than in the bay, or to ſail in a troubled ſea, only that one may ſail, than to gain the port of enjoyment? Let it be the paradiſe of a fool to be ever in contemplation, the feaſt of a Miſer to look on precious viands unaſſayed, or the puniſhment of a woman-hater to be Tantalized with female objects. The noble conqueror in the midſt of fruition ſhall find his love to beget love infinitely, new delights to germinate in every change of intercourſe, & deſires to iſſue without pain out of pregnant ſatisfactions, while the gathering of one crop is but to prepare the ground for another. One kindneſs draweth another, one endearment claſpeth with another, one heart combineth with another: while the bounty of goodwil, the facility of flowing ſpirits, the ceſſion of gentle complacency, the undecay-

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ing youth of ſoul afford contentment to extremity of old age. Thoſe ſouls are now compleated in their union, which a part would have been like ſeparate ſouls expecting the reſurrection: Their joyes are conjoyned to make each other happy: they live each of them a double life, while a ſingle liveth but by halves. They live each of them as much again as they did before. Before they knew not what it was to live. Children ſucceed to augment and to perpetuate theſe felicities, houſe and ornaments, and (erewhile) neglected furniture preſs to pay their contributions, and all inferiour ſtates to veil to this their Paramount. Beſides, whatever was in Heroick love, or is in any other friendſhip is here more compleatly. Such benevolence in either breaſt, as meeteth all evils to anticipate them from the other: Such a well-wiſhing to one another, as is purely for one anothers ſake; though pleaſure or advantage be removed, and ſickneſs, poverty, or diſgrace come inſtead thereof: Such impatience of abſence, as teſtifieth what the dolor of loſs would be: ſuch grief of looſing as can only ſhew how exquiſitly a loving heart may be pained with compunction, how intolerable, how inexpreſſible this reſentment is. In brief, ſuch conſtancy of obliging, ſuch tranſcendency in vigour, ſuch inalterable honor and eſteem: ſuch vindication: ſuch condeſcenſion: ſuch harmony and ſymbolizing of joyes and griefs, that are able to make a palace of a Cottage,

and turn the darkeſt night of adverſity into a ballet till the morning.

And theſe undoubtedly are in wedlock the effects of a Good Nature, but if the ſame that mock at love abandon ſuch marriages (as we haue magnified) to the idolizing of their Paiſans: it is becauſe (no doubt) by thinking to be exquiſite in the objects of their pleaſures, they have miſplaced the true object of their felicity, which is in one and not in many. Luſt will incommode itſelf ſundry wayes, and vitiate all thoſe pureſt jewels that ſeem to be left in another place, and at a diſtance from it. Who reproaches another behind his back, thinketh that other (who thinketh nothing) doth the like by him, and when he meets him, ſhuns him to the others admiration, and (at laſt) brings inſenſibly upon himſelf, and beyond intention, what at firſt he ſuſpected. So he that wrongs his marriage-bed makes himſelf jealous at the firſt without a cauſe, and at laſt not without reaſon. Howſoever it will with-draw affection (which is the true bond of happineſs, and not any ſenſual fruition) and then he ſhall at once diſſolve all the ligaments of his houſe, the contignation of his family, for as he ſtands affected to the tree, he will ſtand to the branches, and the children reciprocally to them both Luxury will not flow in without other violations. But who think to retain the vice, and to provide againſt the inconveniencies will hardly ſcape others, that they

they foreſaw not. Although what arguments to ſuch as can collude with vertue? Their prudence cannot be upheld long, as it is diſjoyned from that connexion: nor misfortunes be declined. *Non poteſt jucundè vivo, niſi cum virtute vivatur.*

But ſhall we dare to oppoſe the Maxims of our Grandſirs? That perſons are equal, fortunes only do incline, that marriage is only for conveniency, love will follow, where 'tis well provided: that a beauty is no attractive, or vertue any motive to a wiſe-man. That the fondneſſes of youth are to be broken otherwayes, that wealth and honour may be eſpouſed at the laſt, and a potent family rather then a moſt accompliſht perſon? Italian Contracts! where the ſon ſeeth not the daughter, which the *Gente honorate* have adjuſted for him, till the wedding-day: As many of our heirs here until conveighances and ſettlements be ready for the ſealing. If theſe be occaſion of like accord to follow, indeed there is need of caution in the contract, but whether a Good Nature can ſuffice to all adventures, I muſt rather crave time for experience, than undertake to argue here.

§. VI. While we treat only of the Amicable bent of a Good Nature, with the Acts and characters thereof, though we may intrench ſomewhat upon the Topick of friendſhip, yet we are not bound to follow the extent of that vertue (if I may ſo call it) or ſyſtan rather of many ſingular excel-

excellencies, but only to trace the rudiments of Social Amity in an incorrupted Nature: A ſociable Nature I take to be moſt humane, and apt to Amity, and the more Amicable, the more ſociable. Therefore firſt, let us take ſome notice wherein it ſeems to ſuffer violence or reſtraint.

1. In altitudes, or acts of bravery: which extend the habit either of the mind, or of the object, when it is diſcerned, we diſcover a ridiculous puſillanimity; one makeing ombrage of a petty office with much eſtate, another prodigal of officiouſneſs about nothing. We deſpiſe a little ſpirit in attempting a great matter, which we call offering at a thing; and an oſtentator of magnanimity in a thing mean and ordinary. Who would not laugh at a Spaniſh ſmith, coming with his long cloak and ſword (to be put off, and laid aſide in order) to ſhooe an horſe? Or a Mountebank deſcending from his Coach, or litter to draw a tooth upon the ſtage? So in morals, to do any little acts of kindneſs with a flouriſh and vapour, ſhewes that there is not much goodneſs to be expected there; but that it is intended, a little ſhould go far, and be more requited, then deſerveth. When we ſee another as buſy as a nurſe to pleaſe a child, (when ſhe gives it Porcelain, or Venice-glaſſes to break for its pleaſure) to obtain a little breath of favour. Do we not think ſtrange of his profuſion? If real kindneſſes be ſquandred away, without reſpect

Mr. *Howell.*

ſpect of times, or perſons, only that abundance of good will may be noted; thoſe uneven ſtretches will render Nature low at another time, when it ſhould riſe up to be adequate to occaſion: whereas ſhe delights to keep an even courſe of bounty, and not to ſtrain but for ſome advantage to herſelf, in the ſame individual, or another.

2. In indifferency, and remiſſneſs nature is no leſs reſtrained, whether it be in ſluggiſh flat demeanures, which are accounted good only becauſe they are thought to have no hurt in them; or in ſervile complyance, which ſeemeth to be ſo loving, as if it loved all (and ſo it doth alike) and hated none. It contradicteth not, nor admoniſheth, nor diſliketh. Only to keep its own quiet, ſet a compa[illegible] quite contrary, and it is not altered: but as this may admit of ſome cunning, as well as the complaiſance of ſome courtiers, we ſhall waive it, as not intending to ſpeak of things artificial. Our Good Nature towards its proper objects is rational without ſtudying, free without impulſe, and keen and active of its own vigour.

§. §. I. The firſt reſpect wherein we ſhall conſider it, is in its love of company, whether ordinary or adventitious.

1. With its confidents it is an hearts eaſe to communicate; the only pleaſure of the ſoul being in diffuſion, and the only grief to be pent up in ſolitude, and in ſilence. Retirement is an extingui-

tinguiſher to its flames, and obſcurity gives it night without either ſleep or reſt. Hence Philoſophers have profeſſed to an excellent art of contemplation, to make the ſoul converſe with it ſelf, as with another, that a man might be *nunquam minus ſola, quàm cùm maximè ſola*, as the Emperor and Philoſopher profeſſed of himſelf. And as Divines teach us of communion with the bleſſed Trinity to recompence the want of external communications, knowing that a mans mind will (Κῆρ ἐσθίειν) feed upon his heart, & prey upon his ſpirits, if it have not ſome object, wherewithall to entertain its ſpirituall appetite. Nor is it an eaſy death to be thus ſtifled; but 'tis ſenſibly the ſweeteſt life to impart our alacrity unto others, that can requite it: to toſſe the ball of free diſcourſe to them, that can take it on the racket and return it to breed a jeſt where it may be ſure to be well retorted. This is to revive while we droop, to grow while we waſt, and to thrive while we play. To live our own lives and a part of theirs; to enjoy our own joyes multiplied with reflections, and enjoy others by inter-changing: to receive innumerable quantity of ſpirits out of others breaſts, and to diſ-ſpirit none, but to live one life of ſenſe, another life of reaſon, and another life in the common light of our acquaintance.

2. Which makes the ſame diſpoſition as covetous to Ampliate this ſame number out of every incident converſation. As it is an indecency to in-

intrude into ſtrange company without occaſion for fear of interfering in any buſineſſes, or interpealing privacy: So it is an inhumanity to have an averſation, or a niceneſs of accoſting, for I may diſturb their apprehenſions with ſomewhat that is amiſs in them, or me: Either weakneſs through diſuſe, or a certain pride in prejudging of the company. What hath heſitancy or ſuſpition to do amongſt the freer ſpirits? Or curioſity of knowing before we venture? Since there are as many forms of receding without offence, as there are of fair acceſs, and the ſame rule of civility ſubſervient to them both. Though women have not all the latitude that men may uſe, yet hardly any but children are reſtrained for want of diſcretion. Nay, a greater pleaſure is conceived (oftentimes) in the company of ſtrangers, then of our familiars, either through variety, or exciting of the ſpirits to accommodate our ſelves unto them, to gain their good opinion, or to learn by them. Therefore are men brought up abroad in Schooles, or Courts, or Camps, or foreign Countreys, that they may gain an univerſal humanity: which is to enlarge their Capacity, and advance the common rudiments of Good Nature, but our diſcourſe is not of ſuch as are highly accompliſhed, or utterly rude of breeding. In the firſt, Nature not being ſo diſcernible by reaſon of its alloy; nor in the ſecond. becauſe it lies invelopped in the Ore.

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Wherefore a Good Diſpoſition will meet thoſe ends with as bounteous an humor, as its meaſure of natural, or acquired good parts can afford it; and avoid all impediments that encumber, or with hold it. Which is not done by ſtrained endeavour. The preſence of what we love, will move alacrity in us, and in them from whoſe preſence we conceive it. Whereas a deſultory humor, or exultancy brought from abroad into an unconcerned company moves diſdain. 'Tis fit we ſhould be modeſt in converſation, and not come puffed up with our own hopes or fortunes (which a mind well-govern'd would conceal) deſpiſing others, but applying our ſelves to accommodation: firſt by civility, which is prompt and ready to ſuch a temper, that eſteemeth none inferiour to it ſelf, and is ready to juſtifie and aſſert to another all the honour that it finds in him (which we have ſhew'd before of our Good Nature, as 'tis void of pride, and then by courteſie; which is no leſs natural unto him, who alſo eſteems himſelf equal (in the rectitude of his mind) unto the beſt, and nobleſt. By which means ſilence ſoon is broken, and complacency looſed, whether it be in ſerious argument, or in pleaſant entertainment. Once moſt ſure it is, that nothing agrees leſs then taciturnity. Should we be ſtudying to be wiſe, when we ſhould uſe our wiſdom? Should we be ſtudying to excell, where if we did excell, 'twere fit we ſhould ſuſpend the uſe, to make our ſelves equal?

equal? Are we afraid to expoſe our ſelves? What account, what ſtate do we make of our precious ſelves, while we make ſo little of our company? Do we affect to be honoured, and not to be beloved? Or do we think, that to give occaſion of ſuſpicion by a ſullen ſilence, will be the beſt way to procure it? Though *Cato* was a wiſe man repleat with ſolid vertue: yet for this reaſon he became oftentimes unacceptable; and once in particular, when he came to viſit *Pompey*, that noble Captain did him all honor double, that he might be the more ſoon, and fairly rid of that ſeverity, which as Great as he was, he feared and hated while he complemented. Deprive us of loquacity, and it is no matter what Government we live under, a Tyranny is as good as a Royal Monarchy. 'Tis no matter what minds we wear about us. Ignorance is as good as wit. Who will carry gold in his pocket, if it be a ſhame to ſhew it? I admire not (juſt at this point) that the Ancient Philoſophers complain of contempt, while I remember what Maſters they were of this Cynical Dogma of Taciturnity, an intollerable thing amongſt men. I had rather hear a fool prate, or a dog bark, then ſee a barbed Maſter ſit ſilent.

But if the argument be ſerious, the ſoft compoſure of minds, and expreſſions (that follow) of mutual apprehenſions have a ſingular power to attract, and oblige acquaintance. A thing, which the vertuous *Epaminondas* valued ſo highly. That he

he thought the day loſt, if he went in publick and did not gain a new friend. Beſides, that the thing bears a ſingular pleaſure, and ſatisfaction in it ſelf, inaſmuch as the ſoul ſees it ſelf by the light of thoſe colliſions; which elſe would not know how to gueſs at the notions, that it has of it ſelf, or the things without it. Such company is a Mirror to ourſelves, whereby we know, when we want trimming, and wherein we want accompliſhing.

Or if the entertainment of our time and converſation be only to refreſh, and divert one another, the moſt homilitical of all vertues is facetiouſneſs, which has a way to gain ones heart, to delight ones eye and ear, to quippe without diſtaſt, to inſinuate with ſweetneſs, and to make the Droll moſt beloved and deſired, for it is (indeed) a moſt Gentile Quality, and ſuch as Princes have found, whereby to remit their Majeſty for their uſe and pleaſure, and to reſume it without any Obſervation. But Satyrical wit hath too much malice in it, and can hardly be ingenuous without aſperſion; or fail to touch ſome perſon more picquantly then another, which is contrary to the humour of our Good nature, that avoideth all impediments of fruition in Society.

1. And Firſt, it avoideth Melancholy, as it is a minding and conſidering of our ſelves, more then others: and inſtead of rendring us able to contribute delight to the company doth rather call

call them to ſuccour, and relieve us, and is apt to make us the ſubject of their notice. And what can they note in it but imbecility and want of ſpirits? Or ſloth and want of reſolution? For a good man will bear (at leaſt) his own infirmities, as much as can be, that he may be ready to aid another, if need require. Or if they be ſuch as he cannor cover, or diſſemble, he will not come abroad with them. *Affectûs uti corporis vulnera ſunt celanda.* When the Gracious *Pyrocles* was moſt frankly entertained at the houſe of Honeſt *Kalander*, while they were at Table, a letter comes to him, that his ſon *Clitophon* was taken Priſoner (if it were no worſe) by the Savage Helots. When he riſeth from the Table, and is two or three dayes ſequeſtred in his chamber with rending pangs and dolors for his only ſon: his gueſt could learn nothing, not from his ſervants of the cauſe of ſo much abſence. And this you'l ſay was noble, but it might be eaſily done in leſſer caſes.

2. Secondly it avoideth anger, and exception. Though *Homer* introduce his Gods and Heroes brawling in their feaſts and publick councels; and the Antient Romans, as appeareth in their Orators and Hiſtorians (though I never read of any duels among them upon theſe occaſions), were wont to applaud themſelves, and reproach their adverſaries both in their *Comitia* and their Senate; yet our modern manners ſeem utterly to diſallow

it. The Italian will continue his fair carriage, while he has retained *Bravo*'s to revenge his conceived malice. The French after ſome ſhort *Broüilleric* will recollect his jollity, and ſend a challenge to your lodging. The Spaniard will call you no worſe then *Senor* at the rapiers drawing. So much we muſt approve, as carries the ſhadow of vertue along with it, and ſaves embroilments in civil converſation. For the reſt, a Good Nature is not ſubject to exception, is not lightly impelled unto anger; but eaſily reduced unto ſatisfaction, and is never tranſported to revenge.

1. Not exceptious, for the cauſes of that are incompatible unto this. It is not of a faint and weariſh temper, having a ſound mind in a ſound body: the one of which (however) is able to correct ſome imbecillity in the other. It hath never been out of love, or uſe of converſation, whereby what liberty it hath wont to take to it ſelf, it hath ſtill allowed to another. Ingenious perſons have a power over one another without uſurpation. It is not ſhady or retired, fancying it ſelf to be unintelligible, and grieving when it is diſcovered: for it deſireth nothing more then to be rightly underſtood, and if it find otherwiſe, is glad of an occaſion to vindicate itſelf without alteration. It hath no prejudice againſt any perſon or profeſſion, or condition: neither thinks itſelf to ly ſo much at open guard, as to be obnoxious to every paſs of wit, or cenſure; or is ſo tender as to be lightly hurt

hurt by them. And to blow away a little duſt, or to put by a rude chocque in play, or exerciſe is but a ſport of Candour. In a word, being void of pride, it is not pricked about punctilioes, that ſuch an one ſaluted another, and paſſed him by. That another obſerved not his right of precedency. That a third deſcanted upon his words. Or that the company did not treat him with ſuch reſpects, or careſſes, as he might have expected from them, for he is more magnanimous: and knows there can be no violence upon mens minds, but that in their own free actions they ought to do according to their diſcretions, though it be to do amiſs: ſince the ſtrictneſs of equity is hard to be had even from law, and honor: & we do not live (as *Tully* ſaies) among men abſolute, but ſuch as are (*tanquã ſimulachra virtutum*) moving ſtatues or apparitions of vertues.

2. Not lightly impelled unto anger. Becauſe it valueth not it ſelf higher then another; nor preferreth its own apprehenſion. *Opiniaſtreté* is commonly the *bontefeu* of anger both in thoſe that are lightly angry, and lightly pacified, if they be humoured; and in thoſe that are ſlow to anger: but tenacious, and almoſt implacable. Which latter is tyrannical in ſome Natures: but with ſome difference has been obſerved in perſons of higheſt vertue.

*Liv. l. 28.* M. *Livius Salinator*, after he had borne the Conſulat, was brought to judgement by the Tribunes of the people, and unjuſtly

unjuſtly caſt and cenſured, which he took ſo hainouſly, that he abſented himſelf from the City, and all publick meetings. Eight years after, the Conſuls bring him back to *Rome*, but he came in old cloathes, hair and beard neglected, importing in his habit, and countenance a ſignal memory of his diſgrace. The Cenſors compel him to be ſhaved, and to lay aſide his obſolete weeds, and come into the Senate: where he ſate long without a word ſpeaking, till the cauſe of one of his Kinſmen forced him to ariſe: and therby mov'd the Senate, and all the Roman people with conſideration of the indignity wherewithal they had diſobliged ſuch a man, whoſe head & hand they had ſo long wanted, while *Annibal* had been at their gates, and *Aſdrubal* was now entred with another Army, no leſs formidable then the other. They unanimouſly chooſe him Conſul: only he himſelf ſtands out accuſing the levity of the City in chooſing him, that was not yet acquitted of their condemnation. After much ſubmiſſion and entreaty of the Common-wealth he is contented to hold, and to be reconciled firſt to his collegue *Cl. Nero* (with whom before he had had contention) but not without great difficulty, becauſe he thought the iniquity of his fortune did not ſet him on even terms in the action. Then to go out and atchieve his Province, which was to meet *Aſdrubal*, while his Collegue went to oppoſe *Annibal* and to impeach their conjunction. But as he was about to go,

go, when *Fabius* Cunctator adviſed with him, how he would wage that war: He anſwered, that as ſoon as ever he ſhould ſee his enemy, he would engage him. But why in ſuch haſte replied *Fabius*. *Aut ex hoſte, egregiam gloriam, inquit, aut ex civibus victis gaudium, meritum certò, etſi non honeſtum capiam.* Notwithſtanding he acted in entire correſpendency with his Collegue, and they returned both in Triumph. But when afterwards this Magiſtracy was expired, aed they were both choſen Cenſors. *Nero* who before was the more placable, diſcovered now his Malignity rather was the greater; for he degraded *Livius* his Collegue, becauſe he had been condemned by the people, and in revenge, *Livius* did the ſame to him for falſe teſtimony, and reconcilement: and withal left all the Tribes (but one which had no part in his cenſure) in arriere, becauſe they had condemned him unjuſtly, and after made him Conſul, and Cenſor. *Itaque ibi fœdum certæ men inquinandi famam alterius cum ſuæ famæ damno factum eſt.* On the other ſide, when there had been moſt publick, ſharp, and invetetrate enmities & competitions between *M. Æmylius Lepidus*, and *M. Fulvius Nobilior*; when they were both choſen Cenſors, and reconciled by Authority of Senate and people, they continued ſo unanimous in it, that although their actions were divers between themſelves, and diſagreeable to the liking of the people, they could not

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afterwards be dif-jointed; though the people would have been as glad to have made them appeaſe one another, as ever they were to have reconciled them. Theſe great perſons who have much reaſons and reality in them, are the more excuſable if they do not remit of the heigth of their ſpirits, without as good reaſon to return to a good will, as they had to turn from it. And yet many times their miſtake and obſtinacy may be ſuch, as may render the task very difficult to give them ſatisfaction. The miſpriſion of Madam *de Bar*, the only Siſter of *Henry le grand*, about the Duke of *Sully*'s traverſing of her marriage with the Comte of *Soiſſons* proved dangerous, and a long time unpracticable unto that favourite of the King her Brother, to recover her good graces. And the Cardinal of *Richelieu* pin'd and languiſhed, and yet failed in his endeavour of appeaſing the diſpleaſure of the Q. Mother of *France*, who had raiſed him, and afterwards in hatred of him retired, and dyed at *Cologne*.

*Mem. de Max. de Bethunc.*

There were great intereſts compounded in theſe paſſions, and the perſons great; If therefore they were bound to make account of themſelves, and peradventure did exceed in it, in the ſame act making too little of theſe others whom before they had honoured. What wonder if the indignation bare high, and their own tempers ſuffer'd violence? In ſimple Nature, it not juſt

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to make our ſelves the ſtandard of another mans worth, or his approving of himſelf to our judgements and apprehenſions to be the exact quadrat of the rectitude of his actions, or as he pleaſeth or diſpleaſeth us, ſo to ſet him by, or to ſet by him: for we may value our ſelves as we are valued by others, but we may not value others as they value us, to reſpect them juſt to that degree and no otherwiſe: although it be (in effect) the more frequent uſe and practiſe.

Beſides the ſame impulſives that are ordinary are not to a Good Nature. For what is a ſenſe of incivility, or contempt to one that is void of pride? Or how weak to one that is ſo full of goodneſs, that he rather acccounteth the ſame to have been but a negligence or omiſſion, or inadvertency? Or in fine, how null and void to one, that doth not more take upon him to be Judge of the Action, then the party obnoxious, whom he preſumeth to have judged otherwiſe?

3. Wherefore it is eaſie to be pacified, having ſuch arguments ready; and being apt to coin more ſuch out of the ſame mint, for it cannot retain its anger without pain, though it have not had ſatisfaction It cannot ſo highly reſent oppoſition, ſince it knowes none eſcape it. It cannot ſtick preciſely to its own rules or apprehenſions, knowing that other men have others, either in the general, or as to their particulars, no leſs convenient. It knows that no man ſerves to all turns, but

but to be uſed as far as he is proper, more not to be expected from him. That allowance is to be given to mens defects, and to ſome mens wilful humors, which are not any juſt cauſe of anger, although impertinent, or troubleſome. It hateth the acts as rude, and the effects of anger it dreads as brutiſh, ſometimes it cannot but remit its anger to occaſion, if the perſon be removed, or the like accident not probable to fall again in the ſame manner. In effect, it conſiders, that all men cannot be obliged by it ſelf that hath its common failings, and reſtraints of fortune: And therefore having not expected overmuch, it hath not been much diſappointed, nor cannot be much angry. In a word, it will do any thing to ſatisfy, or be ſatisfied, rather than to quarter ſuch a ſouldier long, as yields no quiet where he is billeted, but drinks up all the oyl and wine of cheerfulneſs. But I ſhall either Tautologize, or anticipate: For I ſhall come again to border upon this argument hereafter.

Yet it remaineth. That the beſt diſpoſition may be moved to a juſt anger, being quick and ſenſible as any other, and the more rational by the better temper. Anger is a power given by nature (not a vice in it ſelf) to repel evils, or obſtacles of good; and the exerting of its acts doth more diſcover what a man really is, then any other paſſion. Never any man was ſo innocent to whom ſome cauſe of anger has not been adminiſtred: whoſe

whoſe juſt and reaſonable deſigns have not been oppoſed, whoſe perſon hath not been affronted, whoſe rights have not been uſurped, whoſe name hath not been maliciouſly traduced. It is but reaſon that theſe move anger, until the cauſe of anger be removed: our rights be vindicated, our obſtacles be removed, our oppoſites give way, and thoſe that abuſed us be brought to a ſenſe and acknowledgement.

4. But, what difference is there in this act and paſſion in a good man and a wicked? Where malice is, the firſt beginning moves towards revenge, and knows no moderation in its progreſs, it intends to do as much miſchief as it can for the time, with more reſpect to the anger, then the cauſe of it; And it commonly does ſo agitate, and diſcompoſe the countenance, and the violent motions of the body, as renders it ungrateful and odious to ſpectators, even unconcerned. Whereas a generous anger is becoming to many perſons, ſuch is the incenſion, while it is oppoſed; ſuch is the remiſſion, when way is made to it. Such is the motion of mind and body, as ſheweth force and not violence. Such is the progreſs, that if brave carriage will reduce the party, that is obnoxious to it, the paſſion ſtrait is in ſuſpenſe; If not, yet it is not tranſported beyond ſatisfaction; to bring as much more wrong (by way of revenge, and beyond the *Talion*) on the ſubject of its diſpleaſure. So can it riſe, and fall with a grace,

and

and reſume its equal temper without any ſtraining. And where there is ſuch a juſt anger, and a government, and temper of reaſon in the proſecution, it moves every one to be affected with the wrong, to reſpect the perſon that ſeeks his own righting, and not to hinder. But againſt revenge all the world is oppoſite, when it does diſcover the intention. For (indeed) there is no revenge juſt, but in hoſtility: and there it may be acted beyond the law of nations too; In private revenges, only pride and malice do exulcerate the kidneyes and inflame the heart. What would we have for a word miſplaced? An opprobrium? Or a ſlander? Who ſhall judge of it? Will revenge let the cauſe go out of its own hand? Will it ſuffer it to be extenuated, or argued? That indeed were againſt it ſelf: but to be aggravated, to make an Odium, to move the great Coloſs of honor (like the mighty ſhade that haunted *Brutus* to *Philippi*, that fatal day to him) with the conjuration of arbitrary puniſhment. This it acts and executes within it ſelf and by that means never wants depending cauſes. For a ſuit ſometime commenced in the Court of revenge, upon a ſleight occaſion, is tranſmitted to the ſons and Nephews to be finiſhed. Neither are they ſmall matters, that revenge dealeth in; while it can look on bloud ſpilt without horror, on ruin brought upon its adverſary with delight and glory, and on his loſs with the more content by how much it is the greater, and

the

the provocation given to the Procurer leſs. For in this, revenge doth magnify its own Patron, making it equal to offend a proud man and a Prince. But I dare not enter farther into this Argument, leaſt I be queſtioned into a Duel, which is a thing now in faſhion, and which I do not intend to anſwer at the preſent.

§. §. II. To come to particular affections in reſpect of friendſhip, ſo far as they are coincident with a Good Nature, It may ſeem, that there three ſorts, to which we cannot deny this appellation, depending all, more or leſs, upon our proper choice, and will. Our common, our concerned, and our deareſt friends; which may paſs out of one ſort into the other without any fault or violation. For a common friend may prove beneficial, and a faithful friend to our concerns may prove dear. And a dear friend may ſtand in every particular conſideration of friendſhip. The obſerving of which diſtinction may ſerve to expedite us in ſome queſtions, and ſave us in the mention of ſome others.

1. And firſt of common friendſhip there is difference of degrees. Some are our acquaintance that ſalute us, and ſome come into our company, as occaſion ſerveth; Others our familiars and confidents that uſually converſe with us. Others our obliging friends, that interviſit us, entertain us, and ſtudy to procure all mutual offices of kindneſs to us. How low might we deſcend in diviſion and ſub-

ſubdiviſion of theſe orders, if we might be as curious in the learning, as we ought to be in the life and practiſe of it? For of our ordinary acquaintance, ſome are ſleight and perfunctory; others ceremonious, that regard our quality rather then our perſons; others truly honourers and lovers of us, as far as it happens to them to expreſs it; ſome are accompliſhed with vertues, ſome are ſuperficial. Towards all a Generous ſpirit hath a large and open heart full of love unfeigned, as the merit of things and perſons calls it out, you ſhall ſee a freſh alacrity riſe in the meeting of every of them, more or leſs, according to the ſecret claſſis, wherein they are diſpoſed in his mind (Neither is that claſſis made fraudulently, or corruptly, but according to the true knowledge, or genuine apprehenſion that he hath conceived upon the meaſure of his acquaintance.) You ſhall ſee what pleaſure he conceives in parleying with any of them, what delight in making, and receiving of addreſſes, what light in his countenance when he congratulates, what ſhadow when he condoles, what naturalneſs in his comportment, you cannot doubt of his reality. Neither, that it ought ſo to be among good men, ſince all do diſſemble the like behaviour, as the moſt effectual and commendable amongſt men. And when we come to look into it, none of theſe can be neglected. On the ſleighteſt may depend our fame and reputation, whereby we live in the common light, like *Cameleons* on the air. To the

Cere-

Ceremonious we are beholden, that they think us worthy of that quality that we obtain, and would not envy our Advancement. Though *Alexander* could distinguish, and note the persons, that loved him, and that loved the King. Yet he *Q. Curtius.* did not therefore hate them, or think them Enemies. The vertuous command, regard, and honour, and nothing is so superficial, but it may serve for ornament, if it be well disposed of. In those that truly love and honour us, we have a seminary of succeeding confidents, and a scope to exercise all obliging vertues, and fashion our times to progressive motion. Who are negligent of all degrees of friendship have neither learned how to live, nor how to go about it. The source of all pleasure and contentment! the treasure of all seasons! the commmunion of joyes! the Universal life! I know the Politiques that teach us so much caution, suspicion, secret malice, and dissembling, and I contemn it, as the greatest vanity and folly in the world, locked up in Archives. Wickedness as it were skreen'd up in sanctuaries, or Princely Cabinets, yet gathered up from the dregs of people. *Odi profanum vulgus & arceo.* For our familiar and obliging friends, we will suppose them to be of spirit, and humour agreeable to our liking, for to build upon a crafty nature, is to build upon an hollow ground undiscovered, and to associate with persons that are humerous (self-lovers) is in vain, for they will leave their companion in the

the middle of the way without reaſon, and if any thing or perſon come to thwart them, they preſently break into outrage, and hate incontinent what even now they ſeem'd to favour. It is enough to know theſe, and a kindneſs, only not to have to do with them, beyond the hour of the day, or the *bon-jour*. Yet we muſt acknowledge a good friend may be found ſometimes among the more moroſe Natures. And among the more ſevere, where it happens; that is, among thoſe that have a temperament of good qualities to their ſeeming ſowrneſs (they may have excellent vertues to it) none more noble. But let us enter into our diſcourſe, and ſtick in the Porch no longer, the Acts of a Good Nature in theſe reſpects are divers.

1. It loves to ſatisfy its own propenſion, having agreeableneſs for its proper object. One may deſire, but they cannot love for need. One may honor, but they cannot love for an opinion of worth. One may revere, and accommodate ones behaviour; but one cannot love through the tyranny of duty or obligation. It is ſo free, that it cannot be conſtrained from without; neither can the ultimate dictate (as they ſay in the ſchools) of the practical intellect it ſelf command it. It is not a conceſſion, or voluntary act meerly, (though moſt voluntary) but an emanation, Nay, many excellent perſons, known & acquainted, may not be the object of any great kindneſs to a Good Nature, for want of ſomewhat in them ſuitable to a Gentle Heart. For what

what does it ſignify to be valiant, learned, wiſe, if there be withal in the ſame perſon, an averſation or indiſpoſition to that, that I delight in? Or if he be a ſtranger? This love is nurſed with jocundity, and playes where Nature, or the uſe of fortune has preſcrib'd it. What though the objects be not ſo accompliſhed as others? Yet they are our Brothers, or our Coſins, or our Comerades, or our dayly Viſitants. Or they are moſt loving to us, moſt joyous in our company, moſt apt to pleaſe us, and moſt concern'd to ſerve us in any kindneſs. What though they may have their faults, or miſcarriages? The love is to the perſon. I love him as I love my ſelf. Can I hate my ſelf for my failings, or misfortunes, that happen to me as their puniſhments? Or can I but deſire earneſtly my own recovery, and better doing? There is a ſort of friendſhip (if I may ſo call it) or benevolence rather, grounded in a principle of vertue, which when it failes, the vertuous lover withdraws his affection, miſſes of his object, in the ſubject where it was before. But this is more Divine, and Philoſophical, then to be ſought purely in a Good Nature; which having once conceived an affection (upon liking) to a perſon cannot chooſe but proſecute him with a good will, though he become vicious, even to the gallows or to the utmoſt of diſgraces. Whence it was never counted an unſeemly thing to take notice of condemned perſons, & to ſalute them, & to cheer them up,

*Deuc è amore, qui vi è fede.*

up, going to their executions. But a baſe thing to be aſhamed of their chains, while they retain any ſparks of thoſe good qualities, that we once reſpected in them, or any Colour for their misfortunes.

2. It is born to go out of it ſelf, and live among its friends, to be pleaſed in their ſatisfaction, and advanced in their emolument, and afford its private guſtoes ( if it have any ) to their content, and pleaſure. But I'le let this reſt a little longer.

3. It is not weak, or apt to be diſcouraged; Not of it ſelf, for its love is from pure Nature ( *quæ agit quando, & quantum poteſt* ) it cannot mantle, or corrupt like a ſtanding water: it is reſtleſs and never weary, but in every act refreſheth its own vigour, and buddeth in new deſires of fruition. And which is more. One friend cannot ſupply the defect of another; for a Good Nature hath ſympathy with them all, that make up its body Politique of Civil life; *uno avulſo non difficit alter*. But the pain and grief of looſing, or of miſſing any part ſhewes by how quick a nerve it is united to the lover.

Nor by fortune, which though poſſibly an occaſion, never was a cauſe of love. And ſo, who loved not for need will not leave for need; or ceaſe for fear of loſs; who never ſought gain by his love, or ever knew any other uſe of wealth but enjoyment, or any enjoyment like the pleaſure of ſerving of his friends to the utmoſt. If he joy and

grieve

grieve with them, will he do't for nothing. Or ſtay for asking? Or keep account of exchange of benefits or kindneſſes, to do or return only ſo much as he has before hand; or as he owes on intereſt, or in ſtrict gratitude? There is no account, where all is common. There is no incentive of love like adverſity, 'Twas but pretenſe what ever flaggs, or droopes, while the Relative friend is in being: or droopes not when he deceaſes.

Nor at laſt by any other impeachments or prohibitions: for bars and walls cannot ſever true friends, and in this caſe (if in any other) *Nitimur in vetitum*: we are the more invincible to attempt to ſuccour, when we are inhibited: either raiſe the ſiege, or looſe the battel.

4. It is hardly diſſolved, though poſſibly it may, if he that was once familiar to us, do utterly neglect, or forget us; or fall to ſhameful vices, and ſo precide the continuance of our correſpondency; or if he proove unnatural, or malitious, ſeeking as induſtriouſly to diſoblige, as ever he did to oblige us. Otherwiſe, how ſhould enmities ariſe? Who never knew us do not hate us: Nor is any diſguſt bitter, where the ſweetneſs of mutual favour were not more ancient. We may inſtance in all manner of examples. When *Medea* had left her Countrey for the love of *Jaſon*, and found her ſelf deſpiſed, and forſaken, ſhe could do nothing elſe but meditate on revenge, for (as ſhe argued with her Nurſe,)

*Euripid. Med.*
Βαρεῖα γὰρ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέχεται κακῶς πάσχουσα.

*A lofty mind cannot contain*
*When ſcornful wrong it bears in (vain.*
*Nullæ ſunt inimicitiæ, niſi amoris, acerbæ.*

When one *Octavius* had layen with *Pontia Poſthumia* at *Rome*, and enflamed with enjoyment of her, did in vain ſollicit her unto marriage, he ſlew her in revenge of that repulſe. When *Cæſar* and *Pompey* ( who had ſerved one another in the higheſt concerns of honour ) the pledge of alliance failing, came to contention, nothing but the ruin of one, or other could determine it. When *Lewis* II. King of *France* came to quarrel with his Protector the Duke of *Burgony*. When *Edward* the IV. King of *England* with his Reſtorer the Earl of *Warwick*, and *Richard* III. with his ſupporter the Duke of *Buckingham*, what means to compromiſe thoſe differences but extremity? We ſee the ſame in private friends, who once falling out run to duels; the ſooner by how much the Amity between them was the greater. Diſdain on this part, blazeth ſuddenly, and incenſeth. Contempt inflameth, deſpight addeth oyl and brimſtone to the fewel of diſcontent: So that nothing reſteth, but a pointed moſt acumined revenge, becauſe there ſeems to be no other reparation of diſhonour; Love and favour ( howſoever generous ) are couditional to be underſtood:

ſtood: for they cannot conſiſt if they be not mutual and reciprocal, who faileth once in ſuch a point, he is not to fail again: There cannot be a reconcilement, unleſs you can make a man to be what he is not, or not to have done what he has done, which is impoſſible.

*Pian piano*! fair and ſoftly! There is no ſuch precipitancy incident to the caſe, if a Good Nature (that is no Coward) might intercede in it. *Medea* was not the beſt of women, and the Poet rather brings her in ſpeaking as a fury, then a Saint. He could not have put thoſe words in *Cornelia*'s mouth, when her husband *Anthony* was in the Arms of *Cleopatra* (not ſuperiour unto her in wit or beauty) and ſought to withdraw her ſubſiſtence from her, and his own children with her. Nor were *Lewis*, or the Crook-back equal Princes: Or the Earl and Duke of the better ſubjects.

But when *Cæſar* had overthrown his enemy, he pitied his misfortunes, ingratiated his friends, reſtored his ſtatue. When his head was brought to him, he turned away from ſeing it. When his ring was preſented to him, he received it with tears (being poſſibly the ſeale of many officious tables, that had paſt between them) and ſhewed in all his actions, that he did not ſeek to deſtroy *Pompey*, but to ſave *Cæſar*. In fine, what inward monſter hurried on *Octavius*? A woman is the more beloved, that repelleth her lover

with diſdain, and the more ſought, and the more honoured, if not by him, who had before debauched her. Of a villany extroardinary, I need not undertake to give a reaſon.

But if we examine ſuch contentions, Good Nature may ſeem in the origine to have been depreſſed by paſſion, and ſuppreſſed afterwards. For, at the firſt, if a man thought modeſtly of himſelf, and honourably of his friend, he could not have been ſo ſoon tranſported, nor ſo violently. Have we not ſeen a gentle ſpirit ſubmit his paſſions (for a time) and his reaſon too to his friend, and accounted it no vileneſs? And have we not preſently ſeen the ſubmitter to be the vanquiſher, and accounted more noble? Either there was no cauſe of anger, or not of ſo much, as is conceived. What, if that which is taken for contempt (as it often happens, being misinterpreted) was intended for an office of friendſhip, and that (it may be) not indiſcreetly neither, if the reaſon had been apprehended? What if it were but an eſcape? Or a little ſtart of paſſion? But I grant it was an injury. Goodneſs is a patient thing without the help of Phlegm, and of it ſelf will ventilate the heaving broiles within, without a trifling fann, or Ombrella to allay them. It will make many good conſtructions, ere it will admit a bad one. Or if it find (at laſt) ſo good cannot be made, as it wiſhed, * it cannot bear malice through

*La forza de amore non riſquanda al delitto.

through exceſs of its own goodneſs and reſpect to its friends, but it preſuppoſed ſome exceſſes or defects in him from the firſt beginning, and reſolved not to caſt away a jewel for a flaw.

Beſides it cannot ſtand upon punctilioes, but rather bow the decorum, for it ſuffers no otherwiſe from the injury of a friend, then it would do by ſome great wrong that it had done it ſelf by neglect, or indiſcretion. And who that hath wrought his own diſhonour or diminution by his folly, will add the madneſs to it to ſtab himſelf? And will he add to his boiſterous paſſion the reputation of killing, or of ſeeking the life of his friend? Are not one and the ſame bowels common to them both? To diminiſh the injury, and magnify other kindneſſes oppoſed to it, this is friendly. To condeſcend, to remit *de jure*, to take a part of the blame upon himſelf, and to think of taking up, this were a way to give a day to reaſon, and reſolution, and a certain expedient to redeem any lapſe of reputation. But he hath done what he cannot undoe, and I have ſuffered what I cannot wipe off, but with his blood, or the licking of his tongue? Then you are both without my liſts. To deprive his friend of his favour is the greateſt puniſhment here. And one true friend is impatient of that diſpleaſure from another; and cannot live in quiet under it, though he ſuffer unjuſtly: He cannot but ſeek to be reconciled; and if he can obtain it, will hardly

ever need a second. These joynts well set grow firmer than before, and the cicatrice more callous against offences, then the brawne and muscles.

To conclude. If our friend neglect us, it is but a lapse, and addresses renewed may revive it: If he fall to vice, he retaineth only our wishes, and endeavours to serve him another way, & to reclaim him. If he injure me, I may be angry to reduce him. If he be ingrateful, or malitious, I have no other way in nature but to punish him with aversation. It is against Nature that I should seek his mischief, in whom a part of my self is lodged, in hope of a civil resurrection, or entombed in his unworthiness; and there to ly sacred, and inviolable. If I am necessitated to wrong him in my own defence: so I may be, to cut off one limb to save my whole body.

II. While they strive for the glory of the price in a cornish hurling, they sometimes cover the ball in the midst of the press; sometimes leave a single observator to go way with it to the Gaole: so in this contention concerning the nobleness and use of friendship, while on one hand they admit no end, or fruit of friendship but it self: no pleasure, no profit, no private or publick business to forge, or nourish it: on the other that all friendship is but an idle fancy, a meer notion without some solid interest, as the *basis* of it; or only an abstracted consideration, no more to be found in Nature, then *materia prima* in things sensible

ſenſible: They may leave the truth in the middle. Which to find and bear from them, let us firſt conſider of the later. I muſt confeſs it paſſeth among the fineneſs of the age, as a paradox of courtſhip (and as if untutored ſpirits were only kind and loving) to be civil among men: and more to ſome then others; but indeed to have no friend, or friendſhip: as if it were but a meer fondneſs, a feminine or a chiſdiſh vagarineſs, not to be admitted amongſt the wiſe, or valiant part of men: to whom of all the rules delivered to us from antiquity, there is none that ſoundeth ſo authentick as that of *Chito. Ita ama tanquam oſurus, ita odi tanquam amaturus.* So love as if you were about to hate, ſo hate as if you were about to love. For what account can be given of this charineſs, or theſe endearments betwixt two, or a few perſons; but only to humour one anothers fancies, or to bolſter up one another in ſelf-conceitedneſs; and ſo take them off from action or deſign, wherein he ſhould be no friend, that ſtands in our way, though he were as a friend before? There is a time in prudence to know, and to forget, to take acquaintance, and to paſs by without notice. As our ends alter, and as we advance, we muſt leave thoſe perſons, and things behind us, that we cannot take along with us, it being not ſufficient only; but more then ample, if we have been juſt, or courteous, or beneficial

to them for the time, wherein we had to do with them. All things ſlide, and nothing bide, is more true in this ſence then then in the ſcepticks. And is it not a madneſs to go about to ſtop a current, or impale a river for a fiſh-pond: while every man is bent upon his own concerns to hold them back to be intent upon ours; or our own which are equally fleeting, upon theirs? To think to impropriate the uſe of any man, or immancipate our ſelves, while on both ſides we are bound to covet liberty, and ampliate our ſcope of living, as much as poſſible? Beſides, that change and variety in friends and friendſhip is no leſs acceptible, than in any other caſe: but far more commodious; ſince friends are to be uſed ſparingly, ſome in one thing, ſome in another, and our needs are various, and our fortunes variable. Perſons too do vary from themſelves: wherein a man hath ſerved us at one time, he cannot or he liſts not at another, what we loved in him, at another time is altered: And to pretend conſtancy to one, that is become another, is but forced: So that we had need to be cautious and verſatile in this maneige, where we cannot depend upon any ſure or certain points. When did *Cæſar* (the moſt ſufficient man (peradventure) in all aſſayes that ever was) though he loved many women fore ſlow an hours march for any of them? Though he entertain'd his friends and partizans at moſt prodigious charges, when

Πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.

when did he ever ſtick at any of them that halted intheir carriere? Though he were ſo liberal, he knew how to make more of them, then they had made of him. And who would willingly come off a looſer with a flouriſh of friendſhip? *Qui ſibi Amicus eſt, ſcito hunc amicum omnibus eſſe.* *Ariſtides* would acknowledge friendſhip unto no man, leaſt by favour or diſfavour he ſhould be led into inconveniences. So little eſtate have ſome men made of that, which others idolize, who had rather be accounted Atheiſts then indifferent friends. Notwithſtanding, we are not ſo eaſily to be put by. To covet and to ſeek a pretended Amity for our own ends, and ceaſe as they are ſerved. *Plut.*

*Tuta frequenſque via eſt, &c.*

*To uſe, and leave a friend's a beaten way;*
*Yet beaten as it is, it leads aſtray.*

To ſeem to have a multitude of friends, and have none is to deceive our ſelves more then others, in the true ſolidity of our own concerns. He hath but light hold of another (however he imagine) whom he would oblige ſtrongly for his purpoſe who is but lightly affected within himſelf. The pack is diſcerned, and the fraud as covertly returned? As if the language of thoſe feigned courteſies, colloguing paſſions, falſifying promiſes and Apologies were not underſtood! Eſpecially, when they are to court for advantage (as it often happens)

pens ) the ſame that have been legerly diſmiſt before, and have a ſenſe of our ingratitude! Theſe are veiles only of puſillanimity, which in effect atchieve no great matter: A Roman generoſity will tread upon them. Loyalty is eſſential to a Good Nature and buſineſs and commerce to expreſs it. We cannot deny but mutual intereſts are a ſolid ground of friendly correſpondency, be it more or leſs. Some are only in more trivial matters, wherein whatſoever is given to civility, neceſſity, expediency doth not derogate from fidelity, integrity, and a good mind. Others are more neer and intimate to us. And is it not moſt natutural to us to love our dependencies, our beneficiaries, our faithful co-adjutours, our truſtees and Relyances? And as we find the worth and value of them in reality, ſo to prize, affect, and endear them. That is, to add them to the number of our excellent friends, not according to the advantage only that we receive ( for we may love a friend more who is leſs uſeful) but the mind wherewithal we are ſerved. Who but theſe know our ſecrets? Who but theſe relieve us in our ſtraites? Who but theſe confirm us in our doubtful ſtates? And who but theſe have power to become our enemies if they prove unfaithful? Therefore who was ſought only that he might be uſed, may be retained, that he may be endeared. A friendſhip may be refined from intereſt to vertue, but every one with whom we may have to do, may not be worth

worth the while: for who will go about to extract gold out of lead or tinn, though he know it may be in it? Though Good Nature be not intereſſed in deſign yet it is in conſequence: for advantage and and pleaſure cannot be abſtracted from benefits, and favours, and mutual aides and offices. And it is but an ill conſtitution that doth not thrive upon good diet, and convert it into good humours, which is but a perpetual ſeading of new and inexhauſted gratifyings. Wherefore, under favour, it is no part of imbecillity to be chary of our friends, to commute and ſymbolize in all manner of affections with them. Nor is it any reſtraint to a large heart to have multiplicity, and retain a freſh affection to thoſe, that have been contracted from his infancy, with the reſt that he ſhall collect to his laſt end; but rather this is one, and the only accomtling of his felicity to be a Patron unto one, a companion unto another, a correſpondent unto others that are abſent, an Allie to more, and an intimate yet to a few confidents. All with frankneſs and reality. This is no impeachment of juſt deſigns, but a ſure Promptuary of ready aides: no incumbrance in advancing, but a certain furtherance without ſeeking, no enſnaring of our fortune; but a means to clear, and expedite it. Let *Caſar* be conſidered, and he never ſleighted any of his true friends, never loſt any that he could retain: nay, had ſo good a way of ingratiating himſelf with his ſouldiers, that hardly

hardly any of them ever did revolt from him. A Captain belov'd like *Alexander*, whoſe ſouldiers beſieged him in his Tent, (their arms caſt down) with tears and groans three dayes together, till he was willing to come out, and be reconciled to them in the ſame poſtures. Such is the power of goodneſs, where 'tis mixt with greatneſs, whereas many triumphs of the Rigid, and Tenacious Roman Captains have been diſgraced with the murmuring of their followers. And many battels only loſt out of hatred, where there have before been ſuch defects of gentleneſs. Let us know then that a friendly nature is bold and confident, not more actively with its friend, then paſſively towards him. To ſpare him is to looſe him, and diſoblige him by the moſt unkindneſs; ſpare your doubtful friends; but uſe your certain ones, and the more you uſe them the more you have them. Only be ſure you be certain, and moſt of all confident in your own vertue,& generoſity; which (like providence) produceth and maintaineth friendſhip with continuance of one perpetual Action.

III. But to deſcend to the other part and conſideration of deareſt friendſhip, which (having ſpoke already of Heroick love) we may now term Heroick friendſhip, which I take to be the meeting and coincidence of two good Natures, that reſemble one another, in identity of ſouls & wills: whereof many times the likeneſs of outward features

tures and complexions may be an indication, and a ready token of commencement (where it happens) at the firſt encounter of ſuch an happy pair of lovers. So that this muſt be imagined to be ſomewhat rare, and extraordinary: it being not only hard to find ſuch a ſecond ſelf: in whoſe boſom we may have equal confidence, as in our own: in whoſe help the ſame aſſurance, who can have the ſame delight in our affection, that he hath in loving of himſelf, and in our embraces the ſame ſatisfaction, that he hath in cheriſhing of his own ſoul and body, and who can be equally concerned in our welfare and his own, but alſo to find a firſt, who can love as much, as may deſerve ſuch requital. Let every one try how he finds it in himſelf, how he feels his pulſe beating towards it, or his heart panting to eſcape from him into another breaſt. * This noble affection fals not on vulgar, and common conſtitutions, but on ſuch as are mark't for vertue; he that can love his friend with this noble ardour, will in a competent degree affect all. I begin with this ſentence, ſince it comes into my mind: That it is but ordinary for ſome men to have ſometimes a pheere, or concubine, as *Mahomet* the great (who after ſacrificed her with his own hand to his pride and tyranny) that takes up all their time, and pleaſure. Others *a Privado*, or only favourite, the ſolitary object of their fancy and delight,

*Rel. Med. p. 2. ſ. 6.*

*Scudery.*

delight, as our *Edward* II. was accounted to have in *Piers Gaveſton*, which was reputed (too) an effeminate impotency, and enthralment of his mind. An affection ſpringing out of weakneſs and inſufficiency, and only tending to eaſe and pleaſure: When a man is captivated with a man, as if he were enamoured of a woman; while his time, his buſineſs, his honour is diſtracted: while a ſenſeleſs humour is only gratified: and he that is beloved (for the moſt part) knoweth how to make other uſe of it, then his lover. A thing ſo fatal (notwithſtanding) to that unhappy Prince, that when ſedition and rebellion had removed one he could not live without the raiſing of another in the perſon of the Lord *Spencer*, whom the other Lords finding to draw all the Kings heart one way; they never left till they had ungraciouſly procured both their ruines. So we ſee in common inſtances, who are fond of one, neglect all others, which breeds contempt and hatred; for who are deſpiſed, deſpiſe again: and who think they ought to have an intereſt in one that is tranſported, where they have it not, do envy the tranſporter, and cannot well refrain from ſome attempt upon him. In vices it is moſt common to have one ſeducer, who gains a power upon his ward. We muſt not therefore meaſure this affection by intenſion, much leſs by exceſs, or intemperance; but by adæquation of the object, vertue of the perſons, and regularity of the Acts.

Let

Let us therefore hear my Lord of *Montaigne's* report (inſtead of many other) of his ſingular Amity with *Monſieur de la Boitie*, which indeed he hath propounded to us (though of himſelf as a rare example.

*De l'Amitie ch. 27. l. 1.*

Which he affirmeth to have been ſuch, that certainly the like was not to be read of; and that amongſt us men, there is no track of it to be found in uſe. That there needeth ſo much happineſs of rencounter to raiſe ſuch another, that it is much if fortune do afford the like once in three ages. They were firſt known to one another by report they ſought one anothers acquaintance, they found it by chance at a feaſt, and became forthwith ſo taken, ſo known, and ſo obliged betwixt themſelves, that preſently nothing became ſo intimate, as the one to the other. That it was not one ſpecial conſideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, nor a thouſand. It was, he knew not what, quinteſſence of all, which having ſeiſed his whole will brought it to be plunged, and loſt in his friends; and his again in like manner with a pareil longing, and concurrence in his own: not reſerving any thing that was proper to either of them: nothing that was his or mine. That ſuch a friendſhip aboliſheth all words of difference, benefit, obligation, acknowledgement, requeſt, remerciment, or the like: all in effect being common between them; their wills, thoughts, judgements,

ments, goods, wives, children, honour and life: and their agreement to be but one ſoul in two bodies. And ſuch a friendſhip he affirms to be diſcuſſive at all other obligations, incompatible with any other friendſhip. Though his life had been ſweetly paſſed to the time of his writing, without any other great affliction, then the loſs of his friend: yet if he compare the whole to thoſe four years, wherein he enjoyed him, that all the reſt was but ſmoak, or a dark, and a tedious night to him. In fine, that thereafter, he abandoned all pleaſure, ſince his Participant was gone; ſince all the comforts in the world did but redouble to him the regret of his loſs, thus far that noble Humaniſt, Let us yet hear another refined ſpirit of our own Nation. I confeſs (ſaith he) I do not obſerve that order, that the Schools ordain our affections, to love our Parents, wives, children, and then our friends: For excepting the injunctions of religion, I do not find in my ſelf ſuch a neceſſary and indiſſoluble ſympathy to all thoſe of my bloud. I hope I do not break the fifth Commandment, if I conceive I may love my friend before the neareſt of my bloud, even thoſe to whom I owe the principles of life. I never yet caſt a true affection on a woman, but I have loved my friend as I do vertue, my ſoul, my God.—— There are wonders in true affection, it is a body of Enigmaes, myſteries and riddles; wherein two

Dr. *Browne* *loc. cit.*

ſo

ſo become one, as they both become two. I love my friend before my ſelf, and yet methinks I do not love him enough; ſome few moneths hence my multiplyed affection will make me believe I have not loved him at all; when I am from him, I am dead till I be with him, when I am with him I am not ſatisfied, but would ſtill be nearer him: united ſouls are not ſatisfied with embraces, but deſire to be truly each other, which being impoſſible, their deſires are infinite, and muſt proceed without a poſſibility of ſatisfaction.—If we can bring our affections to look beyond the body, and caſt an eye upon the ſoul, we have found out the true object not only of friendſhip, but charity, *&c.*

I am aſhamed of tranſcribing, their ſenſe and eloquence hath imported me: And yet I have maimed both by the culling: But 'tis more to my purpoſe then mine own.

What ſhall we ſay to all this? If it were but wit, or generoſity, pity to be wrack't or chopt with Logick: but theſe are no venters of ſmoak or chaff. If there be ſuch an Amity, what ſhall I think of my ſelf? if not, what of theſe excellent perſons, that have dilivered it? We muſt ſuffer ſuch ſouls to have ſuffered ſomewhat extraordinary. Therefore I am ſtill either querulous, or inquiſitive.

For what is that, that I ſhould love in ſuch an Amity? The perſon of my friend? not for one ſpecial conſideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, nor a thouſand, but a quinteſſence of I know not

what, that plungeth my will. Will it not alſo plunge my reaſon, while agreableneſs to my fancy is all that is in view? While I ſeem to abſtract from ſenſe and pleaſure, will not this ingulf me in unwary ſenſuality? Is it likeneſs? How can I then love him before my ſelf? Or how can I have a principle before my ſelf, though it be to love my Creator and Redeemer? Is it the unity that is between us? Whether then do I love my ſelf in Him, or him in me? Whether more? Or how do I diſtinguiſh ſo, as to prefer that in will and reaſon, which in Nature is the later? Beſides ſouls have no union but of conſent, they know no plunging, or confuſion. Therefore ſtill I am the rule and meaſure of my own affection, and the conſtant principle to it: My friend can be but a moral, or objective informer to me. He cannot bound, or comprehend me; much leſs can he circumſcribe all my powers and my faculties; though I may yeild them to be determined at his pleaſure. So that I am plunged indeed in this Rhetorick, though I would be loth to ſpoil ſo fair an argument.

But in what order ſhall we place this Amitie? The learned Doctor prefers his Countrey: But *Montaigne heſitates* in a fine ſtory. When *Tiberius Gracchus* was condemned of conſpiracy: *C. Bloſius*, his principal friend ſuſpected of intelligence with him, was convented before the Conſuls, who demanding of him, what he would do for *Gracchus*? anſwered,

*Ch. 27. l. 1.*

All

All things. And what if he had commanded you to burn our Temples? He would never have done it, replied *Bloſius*. But what if he had? ſaid he, I would have done it. Whereupon my Author. Thoſe which accuſe this anſwer as ſeditious do not apprehend this myſtery; nor preſuppoſe (as it was in reality) that *Bloſius* had the will of *Gracchus* in his ſleeve; both by power and cogniſance. They were more friends then Citiſens; more friends, then friends or enemies of their Countrey, then friends of ambition and trouble: Having perfectly committed themſelves one to the other, they held perfectly the reins of one anothers inclination: And make them to guide this harneſs by vertue, and the conduct of reaſon (as it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe it without) the anſwer of *Bloſius* was as it ſhould be. What do we think of this? If the judgement of one lead him unto Treaſon by vertue, and the conduct of reaſon, as he ſuppoſeth, muſt the others too? Again muſt we preſer our friend, or vertue? If our friend, we are as before. If * vertue, our wives and children (at the leaſt) have a preobligement on us. And vertue defends any interceſſion of a later act of choice, between the firſt, and the pledges of God and Nature. Some things are incommunicable of their own Nature; of all

* Cic. *de amicit. Sic deſinit. Hæc habui de amicitia quæ dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem locetis, ſine quâ amicitia eſſe non poteſt: ut ea excepta, nihil amicitia præſtabilius eſſe putetis.*

all others friendſhip may have power. But it cannot by ſeiſing of my ſoul, procure, that I ſhould not be perſwaded as I judge, that I ſhould not will what I think moſt meet. Nay, external things, My Prince and Countrey bear away my allegiance, and the rights of my wife and children are inviolate againſt the neceſſities of my friend (but not the hazarding of them if it ly in my power) I can do no more but communicate with him in all I am and have, that is communicable.

But methinks, my Authors has improved this Notion very curiouſly; when he tells us, that ſuch a friendſhip aboliſheth all words of difference, benefit, obligation, requeſt, or remerciement, *&c.* And ſo it ſeems to me in compariſon; that the deareſt friends cannot be beholden the one to the other; cannot exceed, or ſurpaſs one another: nor have any thing private, ſaving wherein privacy advantageth community. For if our thoughts and apprehenſions were plainly one, now ſhould there be place for advice and councel? If our mutual endeavours did meet one another in the ſame actions; how could their be accommodation? If eſtates and intereſts were not diſtinct, how ſhould one have to ſupply what the other wanted? But ſuch is the Candour of benevolence, making no account, or difference of penury or abundance in one ſubject, ſo either be ſupplyed. or both alike miſerable: Wherefore a miſerable man is not capable of this beatitude. Now 'twas ever agreed,

that

that the friendſhip of dearneſs cannot extend unto many. My Author ſeems to hold, not only that it cannot be beyond a duality, but that one failing the other never can repair it. Though a man may renew his eſpouſals, he muſt live a perpetual widower to his friend. Indeed, we cannot put but one in the ſuperlative degree, but a father of 20. children may have ſo natural an affection to them all, that he can hardly tell (in all reſpects) which to forego, if he were put to the neceſſity of his choice. And of a few friends, when one is preſent he may be as the deareſt, when another comes he may be in balance. Gold may weigh againſt Gold, when the pieces & the ſcales are both even. And it is not probably want of high affections, that holds the common lover of more friends in this ſuſpenſe; but only want of partiality, acting by the goodneſs of his Nature, and not calling reaſon to diſtinguiſh. Of this unique Amity, we are the leſs ſollicitous, becauſe it is not properly any part or conſequent of a Good Nature, but only of ſome Heroick vertue: if any ſuch be in Nature, whoſe effects are impoſſible (to be truly each other) and deſires infinite (to be ſatisfied with enjoyment) whereas by Nature, never any tendency was in vain.

But by this, I am put upon examining, what kind of paſſions I have ever found within my own breaſt towards an high Amity. In my childhood, I found the firſt allective of my affections was admiration,

miration. When I ſaw any of my play-fellows of a jovial, hardy, and complyant Nature, faſhion'd to his own pleaſure, and others favour, I remember I were wont to have an unquiet fondneſs to be endeared to him: ſometimes with more, ſometimes with leſs ſucceſs, until my paſſions, oft returning weary & diſappointed, (finding (as I imagine) ſpirits light and aiery to be made to favour, rather then affection; and that friendſhip could not be without ſomewhat of the deep humour) became timerous & ſollicitous about the next objects that I aſſayled; thinking that I wanted wit or ſpirit to go about to gain any one; ſince I ſtill ſeemed to my ſelf to love more, then to have been beloved. Therefore where I found my childiſh accoglienzaes anſwered, I thought my ſelf beholden, and were ready to ſpoil all by being over-buſy with my fooliſh kindneſſes. But when I came to have learned ſome letters, I found to be of one form, of one exerciſe, and often one in fault together & one puniſhment, was a means of endearing me to one or other of my Claſſis: and that indeed, there was ſome geniality in that affection, that was able to hold us great friends in the Univerſity. Addicting my ſelf to ſome ſtudy, I had a fit of great regret of the times paſt (like the pang of Doctor *Fauſtus*, who deſired of his familiar to ſee *Roſamond*, that had been dead an 100. years before) I could not be ſatisfied for want of pictures to repreſent thoſe brave men whom I read, and read of, thinking

that

that they had left no commendation poſſible for poſterity. Nay at laſt, I could not be kind with my ſtars, becauſe I were not born to know, and live in the conſtant ſight of that moſt accompliſh't and taking perſon the immortal Sir *P. Sidney*, under whoſe two pictures I have ſtood gazing at *wilton*-houſe, till ſhame has impell'd me to look on other things with little notice, and deſire has brought me back again. In the ardour of my youth, thoſe ſame vagary qualities, that keep women from being tame, and entice us, with we know not what Graces (as the birds in the air, render themſelves amiable, as they fly in their party-coloured feathers, which being taken are deſpiſed) allured me no otherwiſe in men; ſuſpecting ſtill there was more in ſuch perſons, than I could diſcover, and holding me enamour'd to the objects of my ſuſpicion, which touched me in things as well as perſons. So that being ready to viſit *France*, I expected to find as much difference as if they had had another Heaven and Earth, then we enjoy, And ſo I found my ſelf in vain affected at the Key of *Calais*, there being a goodly high wall and magnificent towards the ſea, and an indifferent town within it. Since I came to years of diſcretion (which I am feign to account by law, rather then by reaſon) admiration ceaſed; but not that opinion; that there are ſome inimitable qualities and graces in certain perſons which do neceſſarily draw my heart to a *bien-veilance*, and a

paſſion of acquaintance, yet it ſeems to me, when I have made my addreſſes, that not what I like in them; ſo much as what they like in me is my aſſured ground of friendſhip: but if I am ſought unto by any, that has ſo mean a ſpirit, then what I like in them only; or in their intention is my obligement: for I ask no more but rectitude; other accompliſhments I account matter of reſpect, but only this of true affection. And having found this but in divers breaſts, I cannot complain of the falſeneſs of the world (as many do, which ſhould rather reflect on the fallacy of their former judgements, & their oſcitancy of converſation) but rather of my own deficiences, if I have not any one friendſhip high and abſolute. Nothing is more moleſtation to me, then to apprehend, that the meaneſt of my friends is unſatisfied in any thing of my behaviour; that the beſt ſhould not be highly drawen and allured with the poſtures and expreſſions of my affection. Of reality I cannot doubt, feeling how effectual it is within myſelf; but to noble ſtrains and advancements every wit and ſpirit is not proper: Only when Stars meet they leap into conjunction, and accompliſh their own orbe, and amuſe the world with their light and ſplendour. In brief (that I may not ſpoil my character with too much oſtentation) I account my friendſhip my repaſt, my entertainment, my diverſion, my religion, and no fault to be ſo great as any Act of pride, or ingratitude, that tendeth to diſſolve it.

I love with vertue, and I love for vertue (to what degree ſoever I obſerve it) yet I do not covet to Monopolize any one unto my ſelf, that he ſhould love no other beſides me, (I do not think that I can deſerve ſo much of any man) nor am I myſelf willing to be ſequeſtred. But I love to walk, and talk, and intermingle with all the world: taking ſuch friendſhip for reſtraint, and no bounty, which ſhall go about to abridge me, or confine me: ſave only in reſpect of ſpecial Acts, and ſervices. I am contented to live only at the rate of a Good Nature, without attaining higher glory, or ſeeking of an Amity in Unity, and an Unity in Identity of ſoules, or of Platonical Ideaes: which every man that can be a friend, cannot underſtand; or hardly any other, who is ſo perſwaded (as generally we are) of creation, and production of things viſible.

§. VII. When I would diſpatch, I am incumbred; I did not think there had been ſo much in hoſpitality. Whoever receiveth me with a good look is preſently become my Hoſt; and a mans bounty is as much ſeen in his countenance, as at his Table. Sometimes an invitation obligeth more then an entertainment: commonly the leſſer feaſts are the more gracious; and the meaner houſes, and narrow entries afford the more receipt within. The fair City of *Sienа* hath an ancient wall, and a ſtrait gate: but with this inſcription (that ſlack'd my wearineſs when I arrived there)

there) *Cor pandit tibi Sena magis. Thy heart Siena's more, enlarged then thy door.* And ſo it has reputation of the hoſpitableſt Town in *Italy*. I know not whether receiveth the more content in it: he that affordeth a bounteous aſpect, or he that accepts it: for it is no leſs hoſpitality to accept of kindneſs worthily, then to beſtow it freely. A Good Nature is ſeen alike in both, what joy and promptneſs is there in the action? What love and ſervice in the addreſſes of mind and body? It ſtands not upon its proviſion. Let decency, or magnificence ſee to that: If it have it, it is ready to produce it: If not, it is not abaſhed; it abſents not itſelf: it ſupplies, as much as may be, with good will: and it may be grieved, if things neceſſary be not in its power to procure. *Cæſar* in an houſe where he was honeſtly entertained, dipped his ſalad freely in corrupted oyl (which by error was brought to the Table) rebuking his company for taking notice of it; and eat of it yet more freely to rebuke them; & ſave his Hoſt from having any apprehenſion of it. Such a value did he put upon a ſmall punctilio of civility, as ſome other might have reckon'd it; but indeed it was no ſmall matter in the reaſon, which touched ſo nearly on the Coaſt of Gratitude. And ſo I leave the reſt of this vertue to liberality, and her aſſociates.

I know not but I may borrow ſomewhat from the next title, if I entreat here of Charity, firſt, of

of that which receiveth ſtrangers in, and next of that, that relieveth them without: whether it be Humanity or Hoſpitality: It is certainly, a character of Good Nature, which is more apt to condeſcend, then to aſpire; and to yield to pity, then to riſe to glory. The poor Mariner driven in by tempeſt is not to be queſtioned for his pratique: nor an enemy ſhip-wrack't upon our Coaſt to be treated as a priſoner of war. If it be in boiſtrous weather, a poor Traveller is not ſent to ſeek for a ſign, where Gentle people live: Nor a man that commits a treſpaſs by his own misfortune: eſpecially when he ſeeks no more but ſuccour, to be diſtrain'd, or roughly handled. I will diſmiſs this alſo with a pleaſant ſtory. In the dreadful Maſſacre of *Paris*, while the Catholick ſwords reak't in vengeance; a poor *Huguenot*, eſcaping his purſuers, came violently bouncing with hands and feet at the chamber door of the King of *Navarre* (at that time protector of the miſerable party) crying *Navarre, Navarre.* The King was gone forth: a Lady of the bed-chamber, thinking he was returned in haſt (and knowing that miſchief was abroad) haſtily ran to ope the door; and let in a wounded Gentleman purſued inſtantly by four ſouldiers. To ſave his life, he caſt himſelf upon the Queens bed: who for fear leaped out, and he after her, holding her alwayes by the middle, and uſing her as his buckler. She, poor Lady knew not the man,

*Mem. de la Reyne Mar. l.* 1

man, or whether he came to mischief Her, or whether the souldiers intended it to him, or to Herself, but upon her out-cries: in came the Captain of the guards, who chasing at the rudeness of the Archers, he chased them out of that presence; and granted the life of the poor Gentleman that embraced the Queen, to her discretion; which was (though she her self were a zealous Catholick) to lodge him in her own Cabinet, till he were cured of his wounds was not this a noble act of bounty?

*Spectatum admissi, &c.*

*And yet could you but laugh, if you had seen*
*The chast, though rude embraces of the Queen?*

2. For the other part of tenderness, which we call charity; it may admit of some dispute, whether a Good Nature do it for the love of the Action, or of the good that is in it; or only to gratifie its own humour, or the importunity of its own Nature? Once again: our most ingenious Doctor who has shew'd himself no superficial Statist of his own, or our common humanity tells us thus. I give no alms to satisfy the hunger of my Brother: but to fulfil and accomplish the will, and command of my God. I draw not my purse for his sake, that demands it; but his that enjoyn'd it. I relieve no man upon the Rhetorick of his

miſeries: nor to content mine own commiſerating diſpoſition; for this is ſtill but moral charity, and an act that oweth more to paſſion, then to reaſon. He that relieves another upon the bare ſuggeſtion, and bowels of pity, doth not this ſo much for his ſake, as for his own. For by compaſſion we make others miſery our own; and ſo by relieving them we relieve our ſelves alſo. Yet (to do my noble friend, to whom I have a particular obligement the more right) he had told us before. *Rel. Med. l. 2, S. 2.*

*Sect. 1.*

I have ever endeavoured to nouriſh the merciful diſpoſition, and humane inclination I borrowed from my Parents, and regulate it to the written, and preſcribed laws of Charity.

Yet am I apt to imagine, that a Good Nature acting only to ſatisfy the importunity of its own inclination, is more abundant in goodneſs, then acted by a rule, or precept; unleſs it be a rule, that comes to it in effect, (though not in form of words) by its proper obſervation.

We hang (a good part of mankind) wavering, and trembling in the balance, while on the one hand, we are preſcribed a ſtrict and rigid vertue, conſiſting in certain rules and dictates from which we may not vary without offence, and danger. On the other; all kind of actions are preſented to us ſo diſguiſed with the ſame titles, that there is nothing left to be vice: neither any part of life to be ſerious, The Mantle of wit, or love, or honor

ſerves

ſerves to palliate all, that were ugly in its proper colors, both to ſenſe and reaſon. But if we cannot eaſily be exact with the firſt, or diſſolute with the later, it were worth while to know this myſtery: That to live by rule is but to hamper Nature, to live in fear, and fall into ſuperſtition: but to live without it, (as it is a glaſs or mirror, wherewithal to dreſs our Natures) is to ſteer our courſe without a compaſs: for exceſs and defect conſiſt in curious points: and our own Natures (in the caſe) are the firſt Monitors, and the moſt intimate: and which employ our reaſons to be exact about it. Temperance, and abſtinence are certain and preſcribed vertues: yet there is no written rule that can keep us entire in the practiſe of them in particular caſes: for the vertues are not in the objects that are indifferent: nor in the acts that are variable (for that may be exceſs to me, which is temperance to another; and the ſame act as to my ſelf at one time may be an exceſs, which at another time was juſt) but only in right reaſon, according unto Nature; as a wiſe man ſhall judge (not another wiſe man; but the ſame that is to be engaged in the action.)

ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειε.

To come to our purpoſe. To be moved with compaſſion upon the ſight and ſenſe of anothers miſery is a token of Good Nature, which is a divine inſtinct within us, the Original (if I may ſay ſo with the favour of our Divines) of the ſecond table.

table. Therefore to hear when the bowels of compaſſion call upon us, is to hear when God calls, and to execute his will, though we do not think of his command. Whereas to give liberally, meerly on a ſenſe of duty, if it may be called obedience, it cannot be called Charity. And what avails it to give away 10000. Manors without Charity? Indeed the Fathers Confeſſors are apt to teach their ſuppliants of Abſolution, that it is not Charity to give from a motive within ones ſelf; but only out of love to God, and obedience to his Commands; whereby they have made themſelves Maſters of mens Charity: and have not been a little charitable to themſelves. I ſuppoſe we have the ſame ſenſe amongſt many of our Religion: ſince only Rich and Old take themſelves to be bound to Charity, and to ſee a young Gallant drop an Alms in the ſtreet were enough to make him queſtion'd to be ſoft. I am (almoſt) of opinion, that who giveth of compaſſion (when he doth not actually think of God, or his command) is the more charitable; and not the leſs obedient: and ſhall be noted, and rewarded, though he forget, and take no notice of his own benefit. For (as I conceive) the *Samaritan*, that took up the wounded *Jew* did it not out of Religion (becauſe they were as excommunicated perſons to one another) but only out of ſenſe of humanity and compaſſion. And yet the Saviour of the World commends that Act, as true

Reli-

Religion. If a beggar importune us, ſhame may move us, though there be no witneſs; and whereof, was that ſenſe given us? If another do not give when he thinks he ought, fear impels him. And whether is it better to act out of fear, or out of ſhame? Notwithſtanding, I am afraid of this argument, as intrenching too much upon Divinity. I do not queſtion, but it is a more excellent way of Charity to give for the love of God, rather then for the love of our ſelves, and our own quiet or any man, and his relief: but I do not think in Religion, that they can be diſ-joyned, or diſtinguiſhed. As to ſay, I give out of Charity: not becauſe I campaſſionate my Brother; but becauſe I am ſo commanded: but I am commanded to have compaſſion (if Nature do not give it me) and ſo to exhibit. I do not think, that to give out of Good Nature is ſo much as a Moral vertue; but a good diſpoſition: that by reaſon may be directed to any heigth or perfection whatſoever; but without it, that neither will nor reaſon can produce an Act of Charity. So that ſtill to advance reaſon, or Religion is not to derogate from the ſimplicity of Nature: which when Divines lay ſo low in corruption, and imbecillity, I ſuppoſe they mean in another ſenſe, then I intend.

§. VIII. *I* reckon not much what entertainment *I* have made; but *I* am now ready to ſerve up the diſette with a few ſprinklings yet remaining under the notion of humanity; with its adjuncts and

and embelliſhments: knowing that the banquet is oftentimes more valuable, then the whole meal.

1. And firſt, it is the part of humanity to refrain all diſguſts, to reſtrain all incommodities, and to aid againſt the incurſion of any evils in our common life. Therefore it doth not cheriſh in it ſelf any private humour of diet, or repoſe, or ſingular mode of carriage to be allow'd, or yielded to it by any other: it affecteth not uſurpation of precedences or accommodations; but is contented with ſuch part as time, and occaſion, and the perſons preſent do freely and readily afford to it: nor to fill any place with it ſelf through vain glory, and ſelf commendation; or aſſume all the talk; or take upon it ſelf to cenſure perſons, or judge of things; nor admits of jeers, or abuſes; or ſuffers the dead, or the abſent to be traduced; or the ſimple to be too much diſparaged. It queſtions not the merit or the quality, which any one pretends to; though it diſcern an incomportment, it makes no ſemblance of it: it will not expoſe any one, unleſs it be to detect ſome malice: it helpeth good conſtructions, being tender of others fame, as it is of its own, and deſireth to have others ſo: it taketh notice of diſtinctions, being a ſign of rudeneſs to come a ſecond time into the Company of any Noble Perſon, and not to know who he is:

it yieldeth honor to men of ſpirit, and of vertuous acquirements (though modeſt) and to their arrogance too ſometimes. For in *Ben. Johnſon's* company, they ſay, that an abſolute domination ruled with the pleaſure of his ſubjects.

Further, though a Good Nature do avoid oſtentation for its own part; yet is it not impatient of anothers impertinence, or idle commendations of himſelf: but rather ſollicitous and concern'd for him how he will come off: it is apt to bear a part of ſhame for him, if he be impudent: or with him, if he be ſenſible (as it often happens) when he doth not find that applauſe, that he expected. I know not how it happens to ingenious ſpirits; ſuch as have real wit, and real courage to be baſhful; when dunces and droans are confident: is it a vertue or a weakneſs in them? Only this we may obſerve; as there is a laughter that ſheweth no complacency, ſo there is a bluſhing that argues ſometimes a conſcious guilt and no goodneſs: ſometimes a purpoſe of revenge. And how do you think does bluſhing become a Blackmoor? But where this paſſion doth expreſs a ſenſe or doubt (though it be but a miſpriſion) of any indecency, or unhandſome faltring, or miſcarrying, I cannot ſay, it is it ſelf a vertue, but a token of it: nor a weakneſs; but a kind of remiſſion: ſuch as is an ample ſatisfaction of it ſelf for any ſmall fault,

and

and a tacit promiſe of amendment: for he that hath bluſhed for his miſ-adventure ha's ſtopt all anger, and has his pardon without asking: which is ſome relief to ſuch an one, as knows, That apologies are not to be made without reaſon; neither are as other Compliments, but intrench ſo much upon the Quality, or diſcretion of the Author. I ſhould ſay more, that it is an excellent token when bluſhes do not put out of countenance; for then a vertuous confidence is ſeen under it, which will ſoon recover and overcome it: and then, theſe fooliſh bluſhes do not misbecome, but add a ſingular grace and luſtre to a young face (eſpecially) and to the other ſex; for who ſees a Lady bluſh, and take it up handſomely, can hardly eſcape to be enamour'd. It is a ſign of vertue, which is more alluring then the faireſt skin and neateſt features in the world. But ſtill it is to be regarded how this ſuffuſion is recollected; for if the ſhamefulneſs proceed from ignorance or imbecillity, it rather paints then lightens; if it happen to a ſullen nature, it dejects and ſtains it; they cannot preſently reſume their confidence, and reduce it with a glory, as our Good Nature can, and can do no otherwiſe.

To reſtrain incommodities it behooves us alſo to bear our own infirmities and inconveniences, and (as much as poſſibly) to conceal them, that we

may not disturb our friends or neighbours, or impede the alacrity of our company. Sick persons do retire, and they that visit them come on purpose to condole and sympathize with them; only they that have the Plague love to spread their infection, and many that have the Itch; and of this latter sort are the Querulous company, that are ever complaining or finding fault with one or other, being either old, or crazy, or prejudiced, or otherwise distempered.

*Nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.*

Humanity requires us to take sometimes a part of others inconveniences upon our selves to alleviate them; to personate another man (sometimes) to save a mischief that is coming towards him: to bear a part of anothers blame, when we are innocent, and to conceal his, to save anger, or divert punishment; for a Good Nature is averse to all punishment and inclin'd to all lenity. It was a speech taken well from *Nero*, and promising a better reign, when a table was brought to him to be signed for the death of a malefactor, he took the style, saying of his own motion. *O quàm mallem nescîsse literas!* O how I had rather that I could not write! And as *Tacitus* has left the History, he became worst the sooneſt, that we ever read of any. Nay, it is but humanity (sometimes) to run volun-

voluntarily into danger to prevent a greater or a publick jeopardy. And ſome one man has taken ſtrangely upon himſelf. A ſoldier of the Great *Caſar* took a pile into his own body to cover his Commander. *Curtius* mounted and arm'd at all points leaped into a gulph to divert an ill Omen. The two *Decii* devoted their lives for two victories. *Tribune* with 400. ſoldiers took a mortal ſtation to redeem the reſt of the Army out of ſtraits.

We ſee, beſides, when there is a fire, every unconcerned perſon will adventure himſelf to extinguiſh it, when violence is done to an innocent, every one will concern himſelf to reſcue; when a man is in danger of being drowned, a ſtranger will venture in to ſave him. So that Humanity and Good Nature are not only in ſleight and ſuperficial points, but extend to realities. On the contrary an ill Nature, though it be ſtrong, or wealthy, or well accommodated cannot find in its heart to be helpful, or compaſſionate, or communicative with another; but if it be in miſery, it hateth all that are more happy, and wiſheth it were but able to involve them in the ſame ſtate with it ſelf, *Medea* (the faireſt copy that we have of an ill nature) in the Latine *Tragedian*:

*And if thou periſh, it delights*
*To draw with it Sicilian nights.* — *Trahere cum pereas, libet.* Sen.

Or with its death to conjure the diſſolution of the Univerſe with the prayer of *Nero*,

Ἐμοῦ θανόντος γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί. — *Let earth and fire when I muſt dy Be mixt and temper'd with the skie.*

Or as *Perſeus*, the laſt King of *Macedon*, when he was taken captive by the *Romans* (trained from a Sanctuary) curſed thoſe Gods, that had not afforded him protection.

Which makes me think of what an admirable temper that ignoble vertue patience is compounded, while it is either not at all regarded, or noted only by ſuperficial animadverters, as a mark of abjection, or a poor ſpirit; it ſignifies an excellent æquanimity, an invincible fortitude, a certain prudence, and a ſingular piece and proportion of good humors, which neither taxeth fate, nor providence, nor repineth at ſeeming inequalities, while it ſees its inferiors preferred, its fortunes diſſipated, its merits undervalued, its friends diſheartened; while nothing in the world ſeems to favour it; it is not curdled, or turned, but ſaves it ſelf with ſalt, and reſerves it ſelf for the freſh water: what were all the arguments of Philoſophy concerning vanity, indifferency, metriopathy, if they had not this ſubject? What were all valour, or hardineſs, or skill of enterprizing, if there were not

not patience to endure incommodities, and expect the best seasons? In fine, what end would there be of injuries, if there were not this Good Natur'd quality to bound, and determine them? Either to subside in oblivion, or a voluntary sequestration of revengeful thoughts? When we read that Wine, and Women, and Truth are strongest, why was not time thought upon, which conquers and preys on all things? Ψήχει καὶ πέτρην ὁ πολὺς χρόνος οὐδὲ σιδήρου φήδεται. Yet patience bows the fangs of time, and brings about that victory by culling seasons out of it, which neither force nor fortune could complete at once, compatible but to a Good Nature and an high Spirit, if it be not maliciously mistaken; a stupidity (suppose) or a rest after weariness, or a manicle of pure force and necessity are no more then brutish.

Lastly, as an aid against incursion of evil accidents humanity is never out of one office or another, either to procure Amities, or prevent enmities, or reconcile breaches, or to clear some mens reputations, or to cover some mens disgraces, or palliate others just designs that they may gain effect; it being most essential to a Good Nature to be loyal and trusty, and as secret as its discretion serves to be. It delights in speaking praises, and in relating any mans good fortune, without any glance of envy or detraction. Nay, it is not

not much concerned with the ſucceſs of an enemy, or repineth at anothers gain obtained to its own prejudice, if not unjuſtly. For it ſeeks its own intereſt with a moſt indifferent induſtry in reſpect of paſſion; though a moſt intenſe in reſpect of action, becauſe it moves only in a ſtreight line, and will rather waive its own advantage, then interfere with another, that ſeeks it in the ſame way. In fine, a Good Nature is entirely ſo juſt, that a dog, or an horſe, or an old tree fare the better for it.

§. §. II. It is the part of Humanity to ampliate all favours, to extend all bounties, to ſhare and not exempt it ſelf from common lot and fortune.

To begin with affability, which is an exhibiting of ones own perſon to ordinary uſe and accommodation, to confer and to converſe among men without exception; it hath ever been in ſuch honor amongſt all civil Nations, and in ſuch reſtraint amongſt the barbarous, as argues it to be an excellent point of humanity, though nothing ſeem more natural and familiar. The life and inſtitution of King *Cyrus* was form'd to this kind of liberality, inſomuch that if any of his friends were disjoyned from him at the Table, he would not fall too, with any cheer, till he had ſent ſomewhat of his own ſervice to each of them.

*Xenoph.*

them. *Alexander* was free and open to all his ſoldiers: *Mithridates* could call whole regiments by their names; and *Caſar* was ſo converſant amongſt his men, that every one was ambitious to be known to him, and by him to be call'd upon by name gave each man invincible reſolution. *M. Antonius*, who alone of all the Emperors (in the judgement of the Hiſtorian) did apply the ſtudy of Philoſophers not to terms of ſpeech, or knowledge of opinions, but to uſe and practice in his life; did demean himſelf ſo civilly and agreeably unto all men, that he gave his hand freely to all that came to him, and ſuffered not his Guards to prohibit any one. *Herodian. l.* 1.

On the other ſide the Kings and Emperors of the Barbarous Nations have uſed from ancient times hitherto, to keep themſelves at a great diſtance from the people, rarely to be ſeen, never to be ſpoken to but by ſome few of their favourites. As at this day the *Ruſſian*, the *Mogul*, and the *Grand Seignior*; a thing that renders them as odious, as contemptible to our European manners; which exact from our greateſt Perſons (one time or other) the greateſt affability. Much more of meaner ſubjects to be eaſie of acceſs, ready of ſpeech, and ſpeedy of diſpatch.

And to this it may ſeem that curteſie properly doth belong giving and receiving all kind of favour in

in comportment, wherein it is a ſhame to be vanquiſhed, and a glory to contend in condeſcention. Every Complimenter knows this, but he turns his back and laughs, and this that is not ſeen makes the compliment (as the vulgar count it) the other is but obligation, and ought to be ſincere. And it implies two things; firſt, that a man does not eſteem himſelf better then another (ſaving his quality, if there be any difference.) And ſecondly, that he is ſenſible of any favour, and does not take a kindneſs (as I have heard the *French* to tax the humor of us *Engliſh*) for an obligation, which alſo implies two things farther; firſt, that a courteous perſon gently weighs the tendency of a fair addreſs; and ſecondly, that he anſwers it with reality according to import. If it be an excuſe, he takes it in good part, and is not difficult: if it be a tender, he receives it with remerciment: if it be a benefit, he ſhews what account he makes of it by his expreſſions of alacrity. And when the party is gone, the ſenſe is doubted, by how much aſſentation is removed, and to acknowledge now is more free, for what elſe can a man juſtly glory in, but in that wherein he ſecretly rejoyceth? Gratitude in a generous heart is ſweet, and moſt prolifique of good humours. It gurgleth with the heart-bloud out of one ventricle into another, till it be heated to perfection, and fit to engender more kindneſſes, And what pleaſure doth it multiply

tiply in that conceipt? how doth it prefer to live in other breasts, more then in its own? And to perish that it may revive to a loving remembrance? Which is the reason why it is perpetual, and can never be disobliged; boundless, and thinks it never has requited; and insatiable in the coveting of new exchanges.

It is a part of courtesy too, to be ready to be acquainted, as well as accosted; but there is a secret difficulty, which I have observed ordinary in this particular amongst the better spirits; and that is, from whence in point of decency, or expediency an acquaintance should begin, if two persons be well disposed to it. One is loth to seek: the other loth to interpret such apparence, before it is expresst (though possibly perceived) least he should be overforward, or mistaken: for a free spirit cannot be like *Horace* his *tantum* in seeking of acquaintance: he cannot impose himself, or demit of his own spirit, to be ingratiated with a stranger: but they do not observe while they affect to reserve to each other a particular point of grandeur, they stand off in punctilio's, which are petty feminine intrigues, and not magnanimous: whereas true greatness is preserved only by generosity. Every man is open to another, when occasion brings them

*Occurrit quidam notus mihi nomine tantùm*, &c. Ser. 1. Sat. 9.

them into preſence: and every good intention juſtifies it ſelf, if there be no intereſt to draw it into ſuſpition. Acceſs and receſs are free, and to faſhion an occaſion more particular out of a general, with a natural addreſs; addeth more grace to him that commenceth, then to him that ſecondeth an application; and it ſhould be conſidered; that to enterpriſe was ever more noble, then to hold ones ſelf paſſive, wherefore, where there is ſuch a ſenſe betwixt two, it becomes both to become diſcreet eſſayers, and not to affect the glory to be later: for it is the more Humane to be confident, where a retreat is alwayes Generous. It is another point of this Good Quality to be complaiſant in Company; ſerious where they are ſo diſpoſed; free and merry when time ſerves: compoſed, when we are to conſerve dignity. Light and active, when we are to entertain, or to be diverted. The humour is not to be brought with us; but to be taken up at the ſight of the preſence. Such is the correſpondency of diſcourſe. Not to bring in *Cato* among Poets, nor *Lucian* among Divines and tender conſciences. Nor a Councel of war into a banqueting houſe, nor the Privy Councel into a Ladies Chamber, nor a ſubtle Contract into the Temple: but to ſhew our ſelves well affected and delighted with the ball that is in hand, or the argument that we find upon the Carpet, And ſuch muſt be the procedure to the

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perſons, in whom we are to take content : and acknowledge their variety. If there be of the ( *beaux eſprits* ) the refined wits among them, or of the ( *Cavaglier garbati è politi* ) more accompliſhed Gentlemen ; or a mixture of Qualities and Tempers ; Humanity requires us to conſort withall for the time, as far as our ſufficiency conduceth, and forbiddeth not to delight more in what we find agreeable, and to make our own company out of any number, when it may be done without Sciſm: for we may not break up a ſociety, till it is for their own eaſe, or intercourſe. But if ( perchance ) our fortune bring us into company, where the defects exceed the treat ; Humanity will hardly allow ( unleſs by the way of wit ; which is either of little force, or apt to afford more matter to their petulancy ) leaſt we ſeem to make our ſelves Maſters where we have no Authority : much leſs to condemn like judges in full commiſſion : but yet obligeth us to diſprove without diſguſt, and to retire without paſſion, if occaſion do not bind us. But if it do, a good countenance may be able to qualify the company, or to keep any thing that is unhandſome, or over-bold from faſtning on it ſelf. Not, but that reproof may be ſometimes very natural ; and ſometimes neceſſary ; where it is like to do more good then hurt. Eſpecially, ones private friends humanity calls upon one to admoniſh : but not to entermeddle ( though with

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one particular) where the ill qualities ſurpaſs the good. [*Je trouve rude de juger celuy-la, en qui les mauvaiſes qualitez ſurpaſſent les bonnes.* Montaigne. l. 3. ch. 13.]

To paſs from words to act; we are bound in humanity to direct a ſtranger upon his requeſt; to reduce him, if we perceive him in an error, without asking: to aſſiſt him in attaining his deſire, when we can do it without indecency, or impediment to ourſelves: but we are bound to guard ſome decorum, even againſt civil offices: for a man may not offer his ſervice to a vertuous Lady, that is a ſtranger to him, when ſhe wants a ready ſervant, though peradventure it would be a kindneſs to her, becauſe it will bring a point of decency on both ſides in queſtion: but if there be any great need, it will not only excuſe, but over-balance it to the ſide of high civility. So it does not beſit a perſon of Quality to aid a porter, though he be nearer then another; but if it be to ſave the poor man from any great harm, he ought to conſider himſelf alſo to be but a man. And the like inſtances we might deduce to other caſes. Therefore to proceed a little farther, when we ſee another labouring about a buſineſs, that we can do without pains, it is a part of Good Nature to relieve and expedite him. Some ſmaller inconveniences we are to take upon our ſelves for

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the greater commodity of another, and a little greater on our selves, if they be divers that shall perceive the benefit of our decession. Why should I take up a great room by preoccupation, to straiten others, if I may do as well or (almost) as sweetly with a less? Why should I eat alone if I have to spare and others want? Nay, why should not I delight, or at least command my self (sometimes) to want for company? *Alexander* the Great, when he was with a choice party of his horse in pursuit of *Darius*, was like to perish with his men for want of water. At the last, some of his men brought a small quantity, whereof when he was about to drink, seeing how wistfully his Gentlemen, that were about him look'd upon it, he return'd the water back, saying, he would not drink and they faint. And when they saw his continence and generosity; they all cryed out, they were neither thirsty nor weary, nor wholely mortal, while they had such a King. In the Sacred Story King *David* would not drink of water that his Champions brought him, though his soul thirsted, because they had ventured their lives for it. And never was a King of *Israel* so beloved as he. Sir *P. Sidney*, when he had recovered his mortal wound near *Zutphen*, and thirsted by reason of the inflammation; while he was setting

ὄυτε κάμνειν ὄυτε διψᾶν, ὄυθ' ὅιως θνητὸς εἶναι νομίζειν, ἕως ἂν ἔχωσι βασιλέα τοιοῦτον. *Plut.*

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*S. F. Grevill* the bottle to his mouth, eſpied a poor ſoldier, who had likewiſe took his laſt at the ſame break faſt, looking gaſtly towards it. To whom the noble Knight, my friend, ſaith he, thy neceſſity is yet the greater, And ſo made him drink firſt, and then pledg'd him. And what Engliſh man was ever ſo lamented at a Funeral?

*Ferre quam ſortem patiuntur omnes nemo recuſet.*

A Good Nature is not willing to exempt it ſelf from its part of ſuffering, when it may, or can: but a Noble Nature will ſuffer voluntarily to excuſe a weaker. Which is yet more: Humanity will offer violence to the ſtouteſt ſoul breathing, when it ſelf ſuffers, and cannot ſurmount the rage of deſtiny. *Marcellus*, who was the moſt pugnacious, earneſt Captain of his age, when he ſaw the City of *Syracuſe*, which he had ſo long beſieged ſack't and burn't by his ſoldiers, while he could not help it, wept in grief, and indignation. And ſo did *Titus*, called the delight of mankind, at the ſubverſion of *Jeruſalem*, complaining of the *Jews* rebellions that had conſtrained him. Theſe were manly tears, that are able to affect men, more then all the art, or eloquence in the world: for they cannot happen without a great commotion; nor come from a brave man without a vehement diſturbing the ſpectators: yet when common Nature ſuffers every man muſt be moved. If a man weep eaſily,

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he is ſoft and childiſh; but if he can weep at his own diſcretion, I would not undertake to write his character. I think I have heard, that the Fox and the Crocodile can diſſemble weeping, but they are both but diſſembling. Ingenuity can only preſs them from a noble heart through pity of ſome irreparable loſs; or grief of ſome indignity that deprives it of the honour and favour that it moſt eſteems with a Prince, or a Parent, or ſome Heroick lover. Shall I add to theſe, that it is a part of the bounty of a Good Nature, that it delights in mens affections, and real inclinations? That it thinks it not worth the while to live in this light, if there were not a mutual tranſmigration into one anothers breaſts? If it were not to raiſe our memories above the level, and to live upon the wings of favour after we are dead? And as no Appetite is given in vain, this makes it do acceptably, and avoid all things ingrateful. But however, it is its own reward at preſent, for what in this life is ſo ſweet as favour? If we are preſent with our friends, this only makes us feel the value of our enjoyments: If we are abſent, or dejected, or fallen into diſgrace: that they will vindicate and recommend us is our hope of recovery. And when we dy, we feel (almoſt) within the Coffin the wind and ſhowers of ſighs and tears, wherewith they follow us to our graves: from whence we may chance to anſwer

them in a pale Violet, or a lock of time, or (it may be) in the ſprig of a Palm-tree, with this Motto, *Depreſſa reſurgo.*

§. §. III. To conclude with ſome embelliſhments, which we conſider as attractive qualities in a Good Nature. A perſon may be more beloved for a little vertue well managed, then for many great ones, which (peradventure) cannot be made to ſerve the ends of meaner qualities. There are excellent vertues, that are not properly the objects of our love, but rather of our honor and admiration, and ſo by conſequent have not their attraction ſo much to ſenſe as reaſon, for wiſdom, and learning, and conſtancy, and ſeverity, and courage, and reſolution are only good bottoms: if they come to be nealed with an amiable temper, they may then affect with advantage, and gain more by their light, then they could have done by their heat. For commonly the fortune of mens fancies playeth more with ſuperficial graces, and makes the plauſible and compliant more happy then the Valiant or the Politick. As if it were more humane, and obliging to be verſatile, facile, temporary, then ſtout, invincible, conſtant and immovable. Though theſe be the more Heroick vertues, which turn the world about in ſpite of meaner courages. For attraction, it is it ſelf no vertue, but a ſplendor of liberty, that giveth grace and honor

honor to every action; it is a coruſcation of many fair qualities in divers poſtures, as a Diamond hath a luſtre from divers points according to the poliſhing. Here there iſſues a ray of wit, promiſing more in reſerve, then an height or flight of ſpirit, not to be defined by any other; here alacrity, there reſumption; here a lovingneſs, there a chaſtity, not to be attempted; here a little courage (and not too much, for a rampant luſtineſs doth not become, not a valiant man; and among meticulous women, we priſe not a *Virago*) there a deal of pity. Here is bounty, there is modeſty. In fine, that which is reſerved, or ſeems to be, though it is not ſeen what, gaineth more, then that which is diſcovered. There is one ſort of attraction that affecteth our ſuperiors, and infallibly draws their favours and condeſcentions, which is more in the manner of ſubmiſſions, then in the thing it ſelf. Where there is a ſenſibility of their pleaſures, a reſentment of their concerns, a convenance with the points of their honor and tenderneſs, and a promptneſs of addreſs to uſher up thoſe tendencies; they are taken with their ſervant, as if it were with their own familiar *Genius*. There is another to raiſe the benevolence of our inferiors, which is in curteſie, modeſty, reſervation, and permiſſion. And another of obliging equals, which depends upon their various inclinations.

A liberty of addreſs, a grace of motion, a roundneſs of receſs, an alacrity in preſence, and ſecret forms of tranſition affect all Gentile ſpirits, and leave an admiration in the vulgar. To appear to be kind, and loving, and yet to be choice in beſtowing of its favours maketh every one, that is not haughty, or ſtupid, to ſeek to render themſelves worthy. To be free and pleaſant, and as dextrous to take it up, and become what is requiſite to deceive the expectation; when it begins to be bold and thinks of diſcovering and maſtering what before it admired, trains a lover into new mazes. Expectation is to be anſwered, and not ſatisfied, ſuſpition to be diſappointed. Beſides, there are ſeveral ſuits and modes of temper, which a rich ſpirit hath ever ready in its wardrope: the dreſs may be altered every day with a little coſt or pains. Who appeareth ſtill in one habit of mind and humor is ſoon comprehended, and contemned, though he pretend plaineſs, it is taken for ſimplicity. What took at one time will not pleaſe at another. But a ſubtile ſpirit will ſoon find in company what is acceptable, and how to train and divert diſcourſe before ſatiety; while we give our ſelves freely, we ſhould not *noſtri copiam facere*, but from the beſt entertainment riſe with an appetite, and part cleanly, that the next meeting may be more ſweet.

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The reſt I believe are inexplicable, but if they were to be diſcabined by Art, they could not be tranſlated, where Nature were not a bounteous Miſtreſs.

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